Editorial: Continuing the discussion on sustaining self-reliance

By David Beaumont.

As mentioned in recent posts, and supported by the collaboration between The Central Blue and Logistics in War, the Williams Foundation hosted a day-long seminar on the topic ‘Sustaining Self-Reliance’. The term ‘self-reliance’ has a special meaning for the Australian Defence Force (ADF), being evoked in strategic policy and as principle applied across a variety of logistics functions and activities. At the seminar there was little pretence that a military of the size and resources of the ADF could sustain its strategic and operational ambitions independent of its allies. Nor should the ADF necessarily aspire to resource such levels of self-sufficiency in the short-term. Instead, ‘self-reliance’ was seen as a strategic goal that would enhance the options available to defence planners, as well as a means by which it could better contribute as a future coalition partner.

The seminar will be the subject of a series of reports to be found on the sites www.defense.info and www.sldinfo.com. Other articles will be published at The Central Blue and here as part of the #SelfSustain series. In support of the ongoing discussion, editorials here will also point out some of the commentary as the topic is explored online:

In Reshaping Australian industry as a part of enhanced self-reliance and sustainability’ author Robbin Laird from Defense.info contends that ‘[w]hat is required is a shift from the heavy reliance on commercial logistics solutions to more robust mobilisation ones.’ He cites a presentation given by Wing Commander Alison McCarthy which advocated innovative ways in which to better link industry and Defence relationships into a partnership. A similar approach was proposed by Lieutenant Colonel Kieren Joyce with respect to the introduction of unmanned autonomous systems into the Australian Army.

The second article of a specifically logistics bent was published by ADM in an article titled ‘Can the ADF sustain itself on operations‘. This article is a brief summary of the four presentations which constituted the logistics component of the seminar. It includes a brief, but very relevant, comment from presenter Donna Riva-Cain:

‘We must move beyond what I call our Middle-east sustainment mindset …. [b]asing systems were located in areas of safety. Global supply chains were free to transport to safe logistics, where the ADF supply chain then moved them across the theatre. Demand did not outstrip supply. Logistics systems were unaffected in cuberspace. Operations in the Middle-east were supported by traditional supply chains. We were not self-reliant, but our experience did not demand it.’

What of the future? I mentioned recently that to suborn logistics is out of step with the strategic reality facing Australia and the ADF. In viewing the presentations of the seminar, this view seemed to be confirmed. In forewarning the contents of my own presentation, and any further articles, which may follow:

‘If we are all serious about self-reliance, we must be serious and frank about the logistics limits of the armed forces, and the industry capacity of the nation. …. let’s continue the discussion by challenging some of the assumptions that we hold about logistics; that a coalition will underwrite our logistics operations, that the global market – designed for commerce not war – can offer us the surety of support we require, that we will have access to strategic mobility forces that even our allies believe they are insufficient in. No matter what type of war, there will be some things we must re-learn to do on our own. I am sure we can all here challenge ourselves and our beliefs – whether we were ever confident in these beliefs in the first place.’

Further commentary and articles relating to the seminar mentioned above will be referenced as soon as they are made available. If you would like to make your own comments, consider submitting an article to either this site or ‘The Central Blue’.

5th-generation energy for 5th-generation air power

Editorial Note: On 11 April 2019, the Sir Richard Williams Foundation is holding a seminar examining high-intensity operations and sustaining self-reliance. The aim of the seminar, building on previous seminars and series looking at #jointstrike and #highintensitywar, is to establish a common understanding of the importance and challenges of sustaining a self-reliant Australian Defence Force in a challenging environment. In support of the seminar, The Central Blue and Logistics in War will be publishing a series of articles. In this article, Nicholas Parker examines fuel security and potential impacts on a 5th Generation Air Force.

By 2025 the Royal Australian Air Force will operate a fleet of technologically advanced 5th generation aircraft. However, in modernising the RAAF capability, an inadequate amount of attention has been afforded to the fuel and energy infrastructure that supports these assets. In order to ensure these 5th generation capabilities are employed to their fullest, Air Force must capitalise on new and emerging energy technologies that enhance the support provided by air bases.

Australia currently enjoys what it thinks to be a high degree of liquid fuel security. Reports released by the Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism assert that Australia’s market based approach, ready access to the global and regional markets for crude oil and petroleum products, and efficient supply management by industry, has delivered secure, reliable and adequate liquid fuel supplies. Australia’s guiding principle is that energy markets should be left to operate freely, without unnecessary government intervention. To date, this approach has met the current operational requirements of Air Force and those of the broader domestic economy.

Whilst there are economic benefits to this approach, it discounts current trends in competition for energy sources and market dominance, threats to supply infrastructure, the impact of natural disasters and geopolitical uncertainty (especially in the Indo-Pacific region). An inadequate appreciation of these trends has created complacency resulting in a ‘stove-piped’ Australian energy policy; policy that does not appreciate the complexity inherent in future energy infrastructure systems. Consequently, energy security and supply is viewed through a ‘singular lens’; whereby the focus has been on discrete energy types with discrete global supply chains that are disparate, separately managed, and (most significantly) vulnerable.

Consider the following statistic: Currently 90% of Australia’s fuel supplies are imported; 40% as crude oil and the remaining 60% as refined fuels. In contrast to other developed nations, Australia is alone in its total reliance on ‘market forces’ to ensure secure access to the global fuel supply chain. Furthermore, Australia has no Government-owned strategic oil or fuel reserves, and does not mandate minimum stock holding requirements for the fuel refining / importing industry. These oversights induce significant logistics and operational risks to the delivery of Air Force capability. Should a significant supply disruption occur within key sea lines of communication (SLOC) within the Indo-Pacific (e.g., natural disaster, accident, commercial failure, act of terror or war), Australia’s capacity to provide fuel for its 5th generation Air Force is immediately jeopardised.

The National Strategy for Energy Security, developed by the United States Energy Security Leadership Council, offers a range of recommendations to counter the challenges created as a result of the current global security environment. The National Strategy is the preeminent document on the topic of energy security and calls on the US government to fundamentally strengthen a combination of energy security measures (Energy Security Leadership Council, 2016), including:

a.                   Support, rather than hinder, innovation in energy technology;

b.                   Major reductions in crude oil consumption by increasing domestic energy production;

c.                   Reforms to energy-related regulations; and

d.                   Transform the domestic distribution section so that oil is no longer its primary fuel.

Australian energy policy makers must undertake policy reform that is reflective of the US approach, appreciating that the challenges and opportunities in energy security are global in nature, and remain cognisant of the significant implications an approximate policy approach has for Australia’s national security. To date, energy policy pundits have been relatively silent to the 2016 Defence White Paper’s acknowledgement of the strategic influence of energy supply chains and energy security on national defence. Whilst energy requirements and subsequent security has never been a key driver behind Australian defence policy, the Defence White Paper does raise the requirement to “improve Defence’s fuel resilience”. Further, when reviewing a critical infrastructure bill in March 2018, the Australian Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security made the following recommendation: “The Department of Home Affairs in consultation with Defence and the Department of the Environment and Energy need to review and develop measures to ensure Australia has a continuous supply of fuel to meet national security priorities.”

Adequate, reliable and economically competitive energy to sustain Air Force 5th generation capabilities and infrastructure must be seen as shared responsibility between Government and the Australian energy industry. The importance of a strong Government-industry partnership in addressing energy security challenges in the long-term cannot be understated. In the interim, however, there are a number of practical measures that Air Force and the wider Australian Defence Force can undertake to fortify the energy requirements of a 5th generation Air Force. These include:

a.                   Advancing the development of energy technologies by integrating contractual efficiencies for their use in warehousing and distribution contracts. In particular, create incentives for the purchase and use of medium and heavy-rigid distribution vehicles that use advanced fuel sources[1].

b.                   Use an Air Force and energy industry partnership to create performance-based advanced fuel standards in order to reduce traditional fuels consumption. Accelerating the adoption of advanced fuel systems[2] into 5th generation aircraft and military vehicles will reduce the logistics and operational risks to Air Force capability associated with the use of traditional fuels.

c.                   Empower Estate and Infrastructure Group to pursue efficiencies in airbase energy infrastructure with a view to create completely self-reliant airbases through, for example, the use of solar and wind systems.[3]

d.                   To support the aforementioned recommendation, establish an Air Force ‘Energy Security Research Grant’ to fund research and development in advanced fuel technologies for use in 5th generation aircraft, military vehicles and airbases.

e.                   Build an international consensus amongst Australia’s coalition and regional partners on the importance of shared responsibility and coordinated action to deal with future energy security challenges.

Air Force cannot remain ignorant to the interdependency of energy and national security as long as it remains heavily dependent on traditional fuels to power its 5th generation aircraft, military vehicles, and airbases. Despite a current abundance of supply, such dependence introduces operational risks and critical vulnerabilities to 5th generation air power. While innovation in advanced fuel technologies will require years to mature, through the combination of measures proposed in this article, Australia will move toward being more energy secure, and more self-reliant.

Flight Lieutenant Nicholas Packer is a Logistics Officer in the Royal Australian Air Force. Nicholas is currently posted to RAAF Base East Sale as an instructor at the RAAF Officer Training School mentoring newly commissioned officers through their 17 week ab initio course. The views expressed are his alone and do not reflect the opinion of the Royal Australian Air Force, the Department of Defence, or the Australian Government.

[1] Advanced fuel sources are distinct from renewable energy sources such as solar and wind power systems. Examples of advanced fuel sources include biodiesel, hydrogen cell, electric-hybrid, ethanol, natural gas and propane.

[2] Development of advanced fuel systems for use in motorsport has demonstrated high technical performance can be achieved from advanced fuel sources.

[3] There are a range of academic studies that have highlighted the value of hydrogen and pumped hydro-systems to store energy generated by solar and wind systems (Blackburn, Energy Security: Is there a problem?, 2018).

Delving into the dark recesses – how do we sustain self-reliance?

By David Beaumont.

Logistics has long been regarded as a crucial component of military capability, and the supply and support given to armed forces a major constituent of operational success. Logistics constraints and strengths can shape strategy, determine the form and means of operations, and if given nothing more than a passing glance by military commanders and civilian planners, will prevent combat forces from ever achieving their full potential in the air, and on the sea and land. As we seek to answer the question, ‘what can we achieve on our own?’, a really difficult question to answer, solutions to our logistics problems and concerns must be front and centre. A suborned view of logistics in this discussion about self-reliance is way out of step with the strategic reality facing the Australian Defence Force (ADF). In engaging with this reality, we might see that logistics is, in fact, a strategic capability in its own right.

What are the big logistics challenges to confirming our limits and freedoms of action in terms of self-reliance then?

Visit ‘The Central Blue’ here to continue!

On 11 April 2019, the Sir Richard Williams Foundation is holding a seminar examining high-intensity operations and sustaining self-reliance. The aim of the seminar, building on previous seminars and series looking at #jointstrike and #highintensitywar, is to establish a common understanding of the importance and challenges of sustaining a self-reliant Australian Defence Force in a challenging environment. In support of the seminar, The Central Blue and Logistics in War will be publishing a series of articles.


Start. Just Start – PME and the fear of writing.

By Rebecca Marlow.

Through the Logistics in War and over the past two years Dave Beaumont has been challenging logisticians to think and write about their profession. It is important to our profession that we have a robust discussion and challenge perceptions and conceptions there may be about our trade. Earlier this year he challenged all logisticians to write, which had me ponder, ‘why don’t we?’ Sounds easy right? We’re all subject matter experts and we have opinions. We also have a wealth of experience. This could have come from a deployment, or as a consequence of serving in the different units and headquarters of the military. Why then is it so hard write? What is it that stops us from tapping away at the keyboard and delivering our hard-won wisdom to the masses?

Logistics in War is one of a number of Australian resources that have sprung up over the past three years encouraging readers to invest in their own professional development, usually under the banner of ‘professional military education’ (PME). PME is not specifically tied to our career progression model, and I believe that it is really about encouraging all ranks to self-improve; becoming ‘better’ at their core roles and is of ‘essential value’ to paraphrase the Chief of Army, Lieutenant General Rick Burr. This interest in professional mastery is not restricted to military circles, and I have observed that many professions have started to take an interest, especially in the last decade or so.

The way in which Army ‘delivers’ its PME has changed significantly from when I was a junior Captain. The days of being assigned a reading and delivering a power point presentation on some supposedly relevant topic in the Mess as part of the Regiments’ training program for officers are but a distant memory. The proliferation of blogs, podcasts, websites and Facebook groups attest to the interest in PME across the globe.  This ‘Prezi’ at Grounded Curiosity just shows how big the network really is, and where unofficial PME can be found. As Army’s operational tempo reduces, its focus is returning to the education and professionalisation of our Army and not only ‘doing the job’. This is not about pseudo-intellectualism, but reflects the need to prepare one another for whatever possibility might come. PME is one way we can do this individually.

To make the most of PME, to encourage a conversation and ideas, I believe that we need to embrace both reading and writing aspects. Reading and expanding personal knowledge is easy; publishing a reading list is easy. I believe an aspect of true professional leadership is in the sharing of knowledge, and without writing and analysis of what we are reading we do not make the most of what we read. No one of us understands the whole picture and it is in the sharing their views that we can seek the contribution of others to make our own vision a little clearer.

There is opportunity in a group training environment to use writing to alleviate the group think that inevitably arises in discussion groups. Asking students to write an anonymous piece on their understanding and having others lead discussions on the article is one good method of training. Why should it be anonymous? I think that the reason people don’t write, don’t contribute to the sharing of knowledge, is because of fear. If all ideas can be discussed and presented without the fear of being proven less knowledgeable than we’d like, we might see a true ‘contest of ideas’. We might see a greater sharing of knowledge which could have more of an impact on our collective understanding of the issues that are viewed as important, or even change our understanding of what is actually important. By doing this even the quietest, most introverted person in the group has the ability to contribute to the conversation. Being quiet does not make a person’s ideas any less valid.

Thus I return to my earlier question, why then is it so hard to write? For myself it is fear. Fear that I actually have no idea what I’m talking about. Fear that my peers will laugh at my feeble attempts to articulate my ideas. Fear that, in fact, I am completely, totally and utterly wrong. What then is the solution? Start. Really, that is it. Just start. Write for yourself, write like no one is reading, because really, at the end of the day it is you that you are writing for. While there may be truth in ‘If nobody reads it, what’s the point?’ it is your own professional development and your own improvement as an officer and leader that you are seeking. It is your own ideas and understanding that you are unpacking and getting it down on a page will enhance your own understanding of what it is that you do. Sharing those thoughts and ideas may prompt someone else to do the same and grow our collective understanding and knowledge.

Rebecca Marlow is a serving Army officer.

Underwriting preparedness – considering the logistics of the future preparedness system

By David Beaumont.

One of the fundamental questions to answer when preparing a military for war is ‘are the capabilities on hand prepared for X?’. As mentioned in Limping to war: preparedness and its paradoxes,  Dr Thomas Galvin of the US Army War College proposes this question with the routine of military life in mind; the generating of forces, individual and collective training, assessing capabilities through preparedness management systems and conducting the frequent remedial actions to resolve temporary ‘gaps’ in capability. These ‘gaps’ might have come as a consequence of degrading materiel availability, the transition between outdated and newly acquired equipment, personnel issues among many other concerns. More insidious is the impact of the ‘paradox of more is less’ where training and other activities are ‘paid through evanescence and self-destruction’ as people and things tire.

The problems which appear in making ‘capabilities on hand prepared for X‘ are usually things that can be treated easily. Astute defence planners will flex and change the organisation to manage risk, reinvest where required or make decisions on force structure to address core problems. The Australian Army recently went through this process only recently with Plan Keogh, an activity that addressed personnel and materiel ‘hollowness’ throughout the combat and supporting force. What is less easy to treat is the logistics system which underpins the generation of capability. As I have said many times before, the quality of the logistics support given to a military is the sum of innumerable parts. From industry participants, to joint commands, to departmental agencies, to the combat forces, preparing and sustaining forces is a virtually incomprehensibly large activity. The actions of these participants is bound by policy and orders, command direction and doctrinal behaviour.

‘Logistics readiness’ is at the heart of military preparations for the unforeseen, especially for those militaries who consider themselves to be ‘expeditionary’ in nature. It has to be considered, and considered deeply, as the Australian Army thinks about its preparedness. The six characteristics of logistics readiness – mutual understanding between commanders and their logisticians, the balance between logistics and combat resources and elements, logistics plans and policies, logistics organisation, materiel readiness, and the requirement to test the logistics organisation – determine what is practically possible at the outset of war. Behind every major warfighting exercise, such as the recent Exercise Talisman Sabre or the successive multinational exercises underway in Europe, the logistics system is tested. Other exercises are more explicit in assessing readiness such as the ADF’s Exercise Northern Shield which requires a short notice response for a sizable military force into Australia’s inhospitable north west. The logistics system is tested even if in exercise planning uncomfortable truths relating to logistics capability are avoided to ensure the activity can proceed.

Collective training exercises are the culminating events for the ‘certification’ of forces, activities which nominally confirm the readiness of forces for potential operations, but they also reflect the preparedness culture of a military. Too often do these events miss assessments of the components of logistics readiness –  matters which are difficult to assess properly without time and resources. Instead those interested in preparedness look towards models to make the best judgements they possibly can about logistics readiness, or establish preparedness cultures that shape how logistics readiness is considered.  This article proposes two models – force availability and force employment-based models – and the impacts these models might have on preparing the military logistics system for war.

In supporting continuous operations for nearly two decades many Western militaries have adopted a preparedness model which emphasises force availability. This approach advocates an adaptable, modular, force structure which offers strategic planners options for whatever operational commitments eventuate. It is usually executed within a ‘force generation’ model whereby different units rotate into different stages of readiness, thereby allowing for lead-up training and the allocation of resources to enable them to prepare. For example, the Australian Army’s Plan Beersheba, culminating with the standardisation of the force structure of its three regular brigades and the inception of the ‘Force Generation Cycle’, offers the contemporary joint force commander a broad spectrum of combat and support capabilities that can be task organised as required. It is an exceptionally useful approach for long periods of sustained levels of operational activity where the mission requirements are relatively well known and an effective organisational routine can be established. Furthermore, because of its routine nature the costs of maintaining preparedness can be more easily determined than other models.

The logistical complexities of this approach to preparedness are well known to the militaries. To employ a modular force structure properly, you must have a good sense of the ‘slice’ of logistics capability that is required per combat unit across all levels of the organisation and resource, organise and train this ‘slice’ accordingly. Determining what constitutes a ‘slice’ is not easy given the basic assumption of this preparedness model is that forces are inherently modular, structures changeable, and capabilities scalable in terms of their size and capability. Yet if this ‘slice’ is not prepared and resourced adequately, force structures will be imbalanced, ad-hoc logistics arrangements will likely be required for operations, and the materiel readiness of logistics force elements will be compromised. It is ironic that a preparedness model based upon force availability is usually enacted because logistics resources are limited (and not just logistics capabilities) and require prioritisation. In this case, and as currently practiced in most Western militaries who are aware of the insufficiency in their enabling capabilities, the proportionally smaller number of enabling logistics resources and capabilities will be kept at a state of higher readiness for longer periods of time.

A second issue for logisticians relates to the administrative burden incurred in the constant variations of preparedness across the force.  The rotations of the usually limited fleets of vehicles and equipment, prioritisation of supply, and the changes in terms of the effort required to sustain and maintain combat forces in garrison as the preparedness cycle changes demands a high standard of logistical scrutiny. The greater the scrutiny required, the greater the managerial overhead that is needed. This scrutiny is not just a problem for the Services that may enact force availability preparedness systems, but other logistics agencies and units within the joint force that will be expected to contribute to the sustainment burden. Few Services would be able to provide anything other than a general overview of the many different Defence agencies and inputs, including support from industry with respect to maintenance of equipment or the supply of stores, that are ultimately involved in preparedness.

Alternatively, a  force employment model might be used as a defining methodology for preparedness although can be complement to the force availability method. This approach applies a range of arbitrary decisions on a preparedness scenario, made in the context of what capabilities are on hand for that particular scenario. It is there a gamble on the future, and is strongly linked to Galvin’s second question of preparedness, the problem of force modernisation and capability creation, ‘are the right capabilities on hand for X?’. 

The choice of scenario can be defined by strategic events or problems, or to enable a specific operational response such as a strategic mobility goal or a notional operational ‘type’. The former approach is a staple in forward planning for militaries, being practiced every day through exercises and training, and considered in concept planning and experimentation. It enables detailed logistics planning to occur, supports the tailoring of forces including the requisite logistics capabilities. For the logistician, planning is simpler as many predictions relating to distance, demand, dependency, destination and duration can be assumed and with greater confidence. Furthermore, it allows for the development of logistics processes that are suited to the required rates of effort and throughput.

Amphibious Task Group: Road to War

There are obvious risks in developing logistics systems to suit discrete activities and distinct operational scenarios. Although planners may have a good sense of what the future might entail, it is impossible to have a perfectly accurate vision of future warfare which enables an efficient and effective logistics system to be developed. The establishment of an efficient logistics system for one scenario may be viewed as a significant compromise when other problems are considered. The same applies for logistics readiness. It is usually impractical to do what most would like to do; prepare for the most severe event (such as near peer conflict) and develop a robust and adaptable logistics system that meets the challenge. This is prohibitively expensive in a time of peace as it requires the development of huge ‘warstocks’ and reserves, large logistics units across the joint force and a ready industrial sector that can quickly respond to military needs. Compromises are commonplace with this form of planning and while we might find combat forces are being rehearsed and prepared for certain contingencies, logistics capabilities are left relatively undeveloped and at lower levels of preparedness.

There is another form of scenario-based planning that is highly useful for drawing out logistics readiness problems that may otherwise lie hidden; to incorporate strategic mobility goals within the preparedness model. Rather than only identifying what forces might be available in a certain space of time, this approach considers what time a force becomes fully combat effective in an operational area. This naturally requires planners to have a good sense of logistics readiness because such readiness directly translates into a reduction in the time taken for combat forces to be effective. An example of this approach, as discussed in ‘Adapting Atlas: the cost of combat power part two’, is the US Army’s Stryker capability, a capability originally based upon an objective to deploy a Stryker brigade combat team anywhere on the globe in under 96 hours.

Mobility-based preparedness planning is useful for logisticians because it forces planners to consider the most logistically challenging phases of an operation – typically the mounting, deployment and early combat operations phases – as well as the movements and transportation of forces. Given transportation is often the most major limiting logistics factor on the conduct of operations, considering it as the means of achieving a mobility goal is highly important to producing realistic conclusions about force preparedness. Nonetheless, the usefulness of mobility objectives in planning suffers from the same problems afflicting any other form of scenario-based preparedness planning.

Militaries will define themselves on the basis by which they structure and prepare themselves, but they nearly always combine preparedness methods. For example, the Australian Army applies a ‘force generation cycle’ but also requires its ready elements to be prepared for a certain intensity of combat, and other elements on a force availability basis for domestic contingencies. It is unlikely that there will ever be a different situation.  Unfortunately for logisticians this approach to preparedness makes it difficult for militaries – especially at the strategic level of defence forces – to achieve a high standard of ‘logistics readiness’. Different approaches create complexity, and complexity challenges logistics systems that depend on certainty to be efficient and productive. It therefore becomes crucial for planners to understand what risks are being accepted in taking this approach, as it is equally important for them to focus upon those aspects of logistical readiness which will offer future commanders the most operational options.

What are the consequences if they do not? Firstly, the requirements of commanders across the military may vary thus confusing requirements and the mutual understanding between logisticians and commanders consequently. Secondly, it disrupts the logic which prescribes the right balance between logistics and combat resources and elements. Thirdly, it increases the quantity of policies and plans required to enable effective and efficient logistics processes, as well as making it impossible to establish the most efficient and optimised logistics organisation. Varying requirements make the allocation of resources to achieve materiel readiness difficult, especially in cases where numerous combat capabilities are afforded high priority. Finally, it makes it especially challenging to exercise and assess the logistics system when there is little certainty as to most important preparedness requirements. This issue exacerbates the issues generated by the avoidance of exercising logistics-intensive activities in many military exercises. In sum, logistics readiness is compromised, as is the preparedness of the entire force.

If militaries were exceptional at preparing themselves for war, we would not see the chaos and confusion that characterises the outset of conflict repeated throughout military history. Instead, a high standard of logistics readiness would ensure sustainment problems were addressed swiftly and effectively. Logistics friction would be non-existent. There would be no ‘logistics vacuum’ whereby the quality of sustainment degrades significantly immediately after war begins and until logistics forces can reconstitute. The fact is, however, militaries have been given a hard task in preparing for war. Every option taken in preparedness planning has connotations for logistics processes and readiness, and not all outcomes are positive. There is no obvious solution to logistics readiness until just before the first shots are fired, and much of the uncertainty is removed from the planning equation. By then, unfortunately, the die is cast and outcomes are set. At this point the question becomes ‘how resilient and effective are our combat forces actually going to be because of the logistics readiness that was achieved?’

This is an update of a LIW article, ‘Problems with preparedness – why we always seem logistically unprepared for war’, published in 2017.

Every logistician must write

By David Beaumont.

Logistics in War has been online for two years. This post, shared with the Australian Army’s ‘Cove’, gives three reasons why military professionals should write. It is based upon experiences learned from those eighteen months. The three reasons to write apply to logisticians in particular, for if logisticians are to be taken seriously, they must come, seriously, to the debate. Writing is valuable, and valued.

In 2017 Major-General Chris Field wrote of two reasons to write; education and humility. His insights were based on a view that ‘standard officer training, education and experience’ was not enough and that ‘doing more was a personal responsibility’. He regards ‘humility’ as coming from the recognition you do not know as much as you think you know, and that writing and learning lessens the gap between the two. I have read many articles on why, as a member of the profession of arms, it is important that we write. To be frank, I have felt that more people have been recently writing about writing and emphasising the importance self-paced professional military education than engaging in debate and discussion within military circles. However, I found Major-General Field’s comments articulated the two fundamental reasons I write, but probably more importantly, allude to the importance of self-research and self-education. I would like to offer some additional points for you to consider.

Before I do, and at the risk of self-indulgence, it is worth understanding where I have come from as a writer. Like Major-General Field, I have written extensively on my chosen topic area – military logistics – through blogs, journal articles and academic-level papers. While I get personal satisfaction in developing a deep understanding for the subject area, I have also found the writing has been professionally important to raise and discuss issues that may otherwise have remained cloistered away in an obscure logistics-oriented conference. I think the introduction to Logistics in War says it enough:

‘The conclusion is irresistible that the military themselves know next to nothing about logistics’.– United States Marine Corps Colonel George C Thorpe, Pure Logistics, 1917.

Logistics In War’ seeks to instigate and inspire, continue and create, a professional discussion on military logistics that is sorely lacking. Furthermore, ‘Logistics In War’ supports the development of an international community of military logisticians that can share ideas, concepts and useful material in an insightful, courteous and professional manner reflective of the values of the militaries and Defence organisations that its readers may serve in.

The act of writing, and experiences which followed, have absolutely confirmed to me that Army and Defence wants to read. It wants to learn, and where it might not have the capacity to innovate or alleviate systemic problems, it wants to understand where risks lie. Sometimes Army just wants to know what the question should be! This is especially relevant to the topic of logistics which has the real potential to destroy our operational plans, disrupt tactical execution and challenge Army’s sustainment budget if we fail to give it the attention it deserves. Although individuals may not see the value in writing, at an organisational level, I have found nothing but support from the Service and in Defence more broadly. With this in mind, I would like to introduce three ideas as reasons to professionally write.

It brings greater understanding, and from understanding, professional relevance

The importance of researching and writing as an activity of personal professional military has been described ad nauseum. It fills the gaping hole in our professional knowledge that the individual and collective training on offer can never overcome. Army will try to offer us all experiences as a compensation for the inability to prepare people any other way as they assume particular appointments, or ascend to higher ranks. However, this is usually not enough. The research and writing process, as Major-General Field describes, comes a substantial part of the way to identify gaps in knowledge, enabling us to respond to those gaps accordingly.

It is to your own personal benefit that you write. You will gain authority and respect for eloquent and literate debate on issues, demonstrating your competence in the most public of ways. Occasionally you will get a personal email of support, or contacted by a distinguished reader who offers you an encouraging word. Army desires writers from within the profession of arms, and has been quite active in recent years in facilitating constructive and considerate debate on a variety of topics. It is therefore a great time to contribute. Writing can be your opportunity to leave a mark on the Army, and a way in which you will be recognised for a permanent contribution to the profession of arms.

To write is to convince and influence

Another important reason to write is to influence and to convince others to see your point of view. In this regard there is a place for contemporary short form articles (blogs) just as there is for much longer and detailed papers and books. I believe we are in a time where both are required to balance quality and depth of content with the accessibility. If you seek to engage with, and ultimately convince, as broad an audience as possible, be prepared to do both. However, there is little doubt that a well-researched paper creates a greater gravity, and its contents considered with greater seriousness.

Don’t worry yourself with a fear that your work is not being read. I have had many conversations with people who contend that papers rarely get read, and that we should instead focus on making writing more accessible. The recent explosion of blogs including my own Logistics in War, professional military education sites such as The Cove, and other forms of ‘accessible’ writing are all part of this trend. Even then, there is always a niggling doubt as to whether material is being read, including in those times when social media analytics reinforces your concerns as to whether your work may be popular or not.

The ‘accessibility’ of your writing, however, is only partially relevant. What matters is who reads it, and the way in which your writing convinces. Reliability, quality and depth of information is often more important to an audience, especially if that audience is testing your credibility. Furthermore, it may matter more to convince and influence others and the organisation if greater effort is applied to your research and writing. If you are trying to improve your own ability, practice with short articles and work towards the long-term goal of producing a more substantial work. Writing, like most things, is a skill that you can improve.

It is part of organisational renewal

Writing for yourself is important for your own education. Writing to improve that of others is contributing to your profession. We are raised, and often measured, as officers by our ability to convince others through inspiration and engaging with our soldiers at a personal level. This is an essential aspect of command, which is rightly and irrevocably about people. Although memories and reputation follow us all through our military careers, the improvement of the profession of arms requires something more permanent. There is nothing more permanent than words when it comes to communication, especially when those words synthesise problems through research and lead to alternative points of view than the normal. Rather than convincing individuals, your team, even your formation, with writing you are contributing to something much larger.

If we no longer take the time to research and write, our understanding of war will diminish, history’s lessons forgotten, and our exploration of the future will be left to others. Army would be in a state of decline, bereft of intellectual debate or direction, and unable to break the hold of myopic ideas and outdated concepts. The Chief of Army recently challenged Army’s senior leaders (and by extension, all in Army) to consider what Army’s next ‘big idea’ should be. Discussion may be important, but the debate must be manifested on paper and by electrons if it is to encourage a broad-based renewal and stimulate collective involvement and critique. Many of Army’s senior leaders have already contributed to public discussion and support those that write. Take that as a hint that there is no better time than the present to contribute to blogs, journals or larger research papers which can influence, even if only in a small way, the future of Army.

David Beaumont is a serving Army officer. The thoughts here are his own. It was originally published in October 2018.

Call for submissions: #Selfsustain and High-Intensity Operations

Logistics In War is proud to partner with the Sir Richard Williams Foundation team at The Central Blue in publishing a series examining high-intensity operations and sustaining self-reliance.

On 11 April 2019, the Foundation will be holding a seminar examining this topic. The aim of the seminar, building on previous seminars and series looking at #jointstrike and #highintensitywar, is to establish a common understanding of the importance and challenges of sustaining a self-reliant Australian Defence Force in a challenging environment. In support of the seminar, The Central Blue will run a #selfsustain series to generate discussion and enable those that cannot attend the ability to gain a perspective on the topic.

Do you have thoughts on what #selfsustain means for Australia and its region? We want to hear from you!

Australia’s pursuit of self-reliant defence has always posed a number of challenges. However, competition – both healthy and unhealthy – in the Indo-Pacific is accelerating and intensifying, posing new tests and presenting new opportunities for the concept of self-reliance. Further, the increased sophistication and interdependencies of Australia’s defence capabilities have made self-reliant operations and sustainment more complex. The Williams Foundation seminar in April anticipates these challenges by focusing on the impact of high-intensity operations on self-reliance.

A more challenging environment demands deeper thinking and explication of what self-reliance means for Australia’s defence. Two principles appear apparent. Firstly, self-reliance must be sustainable if it is to be credible and, secondly, self-reliant sustainment must be coordinated across public and private sectors as well as with partner nations. Beyond these two principles, however, greater clarity is needed concerning the breadth and depth of sustainable self-reliance in Australian defence policy and the goals that it seeks to achieve.

Informed by clearer objectives, Australia’s self-reliance priorities must be evaluated in aggregate such that resourcing decisions can be informed by their overall impact on Australia’s freedom of action as well as their benefits for specific sectors. However, this aggregate picture is difficult to grasp when self-reliance can range from huge infrastructure projects, such as supporting the construction of new submarines, to small grants encouraging new research and development in Australian universities, through to the development of new operational logistics concepts that capitalise on emerging manufacturing techniques.

The #selfsustain series coordinated through The Central Blue, as well as the seminar, will seek to explore these issues thoroughly. Definitive answers are unlikely – but perhaps a better idea of the critical questions that must be explored will begin to emerge.

We welcome contributions leading up to the seminar to help shape the discussion, but we are also keen to read about how the seminar shaped attendees’ thinking after the event.

We encourage submissions from students, academics, policymakers, service personnel of all ranks, industry, and from others with interest in these issues

To help get you started, we pose the following topic suggestions:

  • What key insights regarding sustainable self-reliance can be drawn from previous conflicts and operations?
  • What are the impacts of Australia’s geography for sustainable self-reliance?
  • What role do domestic industry and commercial enterprise play in self-reliance?
  • What aspects of Australian Defence Force capabilities and operations should be priorities for sustainable self-reliance?
  • What roles should sustainment and enabling of partners play in Australian concepts of self-reliance?
  • In what areas can sustainable Australian self-reliance best contribute to partner relationships?
  • Is mutual or collective self-reliance within an alliance possible?
  • How do emerging technologies potentially enable or disrupt sustainable self-reliance in Australian?
  • How does the introduction of advanced technology systems affect self-reliance?
  • What are the unique challenges of sustainable self-reliance in a knowledge economy and for Information Age warfare?
  • What workforce challenges does self-reliance pose?
  • In what areas can sustainable Australian self-reliance best contribute to partner relationships?

We hope these suggestions provide some food for thought and prompt some discussion. We would love to hear your ideas on what issues should be explored as part of the #selfsustain series. If you think you have a question or an idea that would add to the discussion or know someone who might, contact us at thecentralblue@gmail.com.

Alternatively, you can always contact logisticsinwar@outlook.com. And remember – this issue matters to logisticians and commanders of all Services, and the questions answered in the context of many different militaries.

This editorial was originally published at The Central Blue, and has been slightly modified to suit this format.