In Military Logistics and Strategic Performance Thomas Kane wrote that the ‘quartermaster’s claim on history may, at its root, lie in the effect of logistics on timing.’ Moreover, ‘[t]he longer a nation requires to bring its force to bear, the more time its enemies have to seize whatever objectives they consider desirable.’ In other words,… Continue reading LIW Editorial – SSI, Strategy Bridge and the quartermasters claim on history
By Editor. Meegan Olding, a serving Australian Army officer writing on the Land Power Forum, contends that emerging requirements are strengthening the case for us to rethink joint logistics and its role in capability development, force generation and its role in the operational area. Contentiously, she also argues that it is time to consider whether… Continue reading Joint logistics by design – is it time for a permanent joint logistics formation?
In our most popular post, Australian Army Officer Gabrielle Follett, asked ‘why do we expect logistics to fail us?’. As Gabrielle explains, this is not an issue resident in the relationships between combat commanders and logisticians. Instead, Gabrielle highlights the fear or being without, and the implicit assumption by logisticians that the logistics ‘continuum’ will fail them, as being equal contributors to the problem. Will exercising logistics at a greater depth, or training personnel in a combined arms ‘schoolhouse’ environment be enough to overcome these problems? Perhaps the answer to our issues with trust goes beyond competence and is a consequence of what logistics ‘is’. Battles can be won without artillery or tanks, but deny for whatever reason food, fuel and ammunition and forces will ultimately expire. Risk tolerance is therefore low. Furthermore, as forces naturally exploit their combat capabilities to the limit of their potential – a potential earned in considerable part by logistics – the means of their sustainment are always at a precipice. As Gabrielle points out, it is best that armies exercise well in peacetime to achieve ‘[t]ransparent honesty’ about their limits, being ‘essential to build trust so that when we truly do require lead times or genuinely can’t meet a requirement, our relationship with our dependencies is robust enough to accept that some things truly aren’t possible.’ – Editor.
By Gabrielle M. Follett.
Trust. The willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability of the ability to monitor or control that other party.
In a recent post in ‘From the Green Notebook’ David Beaumont noted that, for the sustainment of decisive action to be effective, logistics must be characterised by ‘trust between commanders, combat forces and logisticians’. Almost every military logistician – and no doubt the majority of our combat arms brethren – would agree.
If we accept that trust between all parties is essential to effective military logistics, why then do tactical commanders in the Australian Army generally adopt a policy of self-reliance when it comes to combat service support? At every level of the Combat Brigade supply chain – from…
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By Chris Paparone. This article is interesting not only for its historical value, but in the way Chris Paparone utilised the sixteen principles of logistics derived from the classic American history of Army logistics, Dr James Huston's The Sinews of War: Army Logistics 1775-1953. The book was written soon after the conclusion of the Korean War… Continue reading Huston’s sixteen principles: assessing operational performance during Op Desert Storm
By David Beaumont. ‘Logistics readiness’ is at the heart of military preparations for the unforeseen, especially for those militaries who consider themselves to be ‘expeditionary’ in nature. The six characteristics of logistics readiness – mutual understanding between commanders and their logisticians, the balance between logistics and combat resources and elements, logistics plans and policies, logistics… Continue reading Problems with preparedness – why we always seem logistically unprepared for war
By Jason Sibley. The use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) continues to become more common. We are all familiar with the military use of UAV’s, and their indispensable role in performing intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) missions, command and control nodes, force protection and ordnance delivery without the need for the deployment of troops on… Continue reading Speed, distance and adaptive distribution – the rise of the logistics UAV
By Erik A. Claessen. In June, 2017 Yisrael Katz, the Israeli Minister of Transport released a video that presented a plan to create an artificial island off the Gaza Strip. The proposal calls for the construction of a seaport as well as facilities to generate potable water and electricity on an artificial island connected to… Continue reading ‘Cunctator’ Part Three: the war feeds itself – civil logistics and modern-age siege warfare
By Editor. Over the last two months a significant proportion of the readership participated in Exercise Talisman Sabre; a biennial exercise which saw the ADF, US forces from PACOM and elsewhere, NZDF and other participants engage in a significant certification of operational capability. Although the exercise may have concluded, many logisticians are still at work… Continue reading While you were on exercise …. articles you may have missed
By David Beaumont. You needn’t venture far to find an article or military concept which in some way promotes technology and capability modernisation as a means of addressing the next, albeit hypothesised, battlefield challenge. Great advances in robotics and automation, information and communication systems, weaponry and the introduction of innovative technologies such as unmanned aerial… Continue reading Technology and what lies beneath – the full cost of modernisation
By David Beaumont. This post is an update of a popular post from the #LIWArchives. The professionalisation of logisticians is a topic that has once again emerged, as strategic-level organisations in a number of different militaries seek to improve, and ‘intellectualise’, military logistics. The desire for ‘intellectualisation’ appeals to one of the three pillars of… Continue reading Intellectual irrelevance and the ownership of military logistics