By David Beaumont

This article, and the series which follows, are an updated version of a presentation given at the Australian National University titled ‘Logistics preparedness and mobilising the national support base: the effectiveness of ADF strategic logistics prior to Operation Warden 1999‘.

Part One and Two can be found here.

If policy and guidance provides the ‘requirements’ by which the effectiveness of an approach to logistics can be measured, the criteria ‘organisations’ and ‘plans and planning’ are principally about the ‘doing’. An important aspect to the ‘doing’, however, is the way in which individuals and organisations control logistics processes and outcomes from the basis of appointed authorities, delegations and responsibilities.

In examining the period prior to Operation Warden, and with organisational issues in mind, it is important to look at how Defence leadership confronted logistics issues, how well information was shared, and how qualified, resourced and effective staff produced an approach to logistics that adapts to meet the needs of guidance. There were two principal periods of reform that affected the way in which logistics arrangements and organisations were developed in the ADF. The first, from 1987-1996, was defined by the establishment of HQ ADF as a truly joint command, with the remit to create whole-of ADF plans and policies in a way unlike before. The second period of reform was the short period from the Defence Efficiency Review to Operation Warden in 1999.

It is safe to say that, despite best efforts, the ADF never really settled on an ideal way to do what it need to do. Furthermore, Defence writ large grappled with the right approaches, authorities and responsibilities for logistics outcomes – you might remember the diffusion of logistics leadership was a reported issue during Operation Warden. 

The Sanderson Review of 1989, a review of strategic command in the ADF initiated in the wake of the Dibb Review, was the starting point – that important formative period – in which the ADF’s approach to strategic logistics would coalesce. HQ ADF would include a Logistics Division – an organisation that also worked to DEPSEC Acquisition and Logistics in the Department – for the purpose of establishing many of the arrangements that would better integrate Service-led activities. LOGDIV’s experiences up until its disestablishment in 1996 speak to why the ADF lacked arrangements which would have improved the coordination of logistics during Operation Warden.

The Defence Strategic Logistics Planning Guide (DLSPG), for example, promised to be to be a strategic master plan to ensure logistics capabilities, whether they be the ADF’s or appropriated from the national support base, delivered effective and efficient outcomes in the context of a whole-of-ADF preparedness or operational needs. You would expect this type of concept to exist at the highest level of the ADF, and that it would be used as a backbone by which logistics outcomes would be measured. Unfortunately, LOGDIV was routinely challenged by the pre-eminence of the Services, and in particular, their ownership of many of the delivery agencies that fulfilled DLSPG outcomes. This greatly affected the pace at which the DLSPG and other policy direction was implemented – if central guidance was to be followed at all. The DLSPG, for example, ultimately proved to be indicative rather than prescriptive, and therefore became irrelevant over the decade.

The failure of Defence to produce an ADF Stockholding Policy – a policy outlining supply reserves in case of a crisis – is the second example to deserve a spotlight. Stockholdings were an issue raised by politicians and commentators attacking the Dibb Review and DOA87 as has been captured on Hansard. The ADF needed such a policy – the absence of one resulted in equipment shortages during Operation Warden. Nonetheless, the production of a Stockholding Policy was all but stymied by five years of obfuscation and arguments about funding. The absence of a Stockholding Policy was repeatedly raised in Senate Inquiries up until 1994, with debate progressing insofar it avoided treatment of the real issue – agreement on how Defence preparedness would ultimately be resourced. The ultimate display of a failure to address the issue came with the taking of the preparedness concept of ‘warning time’ to its conclusion – a pretension that national resources would be available to supplement the ADF if needed, based upon a well-paced and planned mobilisation of national support capability.

The second period of wholesale reform began with the Defence Efficiency Review (DER) of 1996 and ended with Operation Warden. The DER, and the Defence Reform Program (DRP) extolled a joint approach to logistics to improve Defence productivity. It had been initiated by a Minister for Defence – Ian McLachlan – who was sceptical of Defence’s management of its core business. He also maintained a view that resources should be directed to the combat forces upon the assumption that support could be drawn from civilian sources as needed.

The major change to ADF logistics just prior to Operation Warden was with the amalgamation of the three Service Logistics Commands into a single Support Command. This was the first time the ADF had a joint logistics commander responsible for support from ‘the factory to the foxhole’ as David Horner’s Centenary History of the ADF recounts. But while this created the potential for greater central control over the Defence logistics network – its supply chain – much of its effort was focussed on centralisation of tasks, rationalisation and commercialisation. I’ll discuss this in a moment as it is best done so in the context of the logistics preparedness factor of ‘capability’.

By Operation Warden Joint Logistics Command, a subordinate unit to SC-A , was running a Defence supply chain based upon stock minimisation and low operational costs. It was woefully understrength, lacked concepts, doctrine and , most importantly, the respect of other organisations. Moreover, this joint network was not trusted to deliver what the Services thought they required. It is worth reflecting on the old adage ‘until a system is proven, no one wants to trust it.’ It would take much more than the three years until Operation Warden surprised all, to weed out substantial organisational issues.

I have only found one history to mention the National Support Division, though its Head – AVM Colin Hingston – was prominent in being the strategic logistics head for CDF during Operation Warden. NSD, in HQ ADF, was an organisation described as fulfilling an ‘esoteric policy idea’ being the idea of ‘national support’. National support entailed the fundamentally logistics resources drawn from the national support base for the purposes of supporting ADF operations, and most importantly, preparedness. This Division was an evolution of HQ ADF’s Strategic Logistics Division, but was formed to put to be ten years of progression to all the talk about the development of improved civil-military logistics relationships.

This was the organisation responsible to develop the arrangements, doctrine and that should have created civilian capacity to complement that of the ADF during a time of crisis. However, because NSD’s was a strategic headquarters organisation reliant on others to act on its intentions, it found itself in competition with others within the Department and ADF; it had to carve out its niche in the traditionally fractious strategic level of Defence. This was among many reasons as to why the NSD had a fairly negligible effect on the ADF’s logistics performance during 1999.

There is much more to say about the development of organisations and plans by the ADF over the period 1987-1999, but in general, movement was painfully slow. Constant vacillating meant plans and policies that should have been in play after a decade were not, though issues were clear, as was a need to do more. Although no one could have predicted that Operation Warden would occur only a few years following the DER and DRP, it is safe to say that because strategic logistics arrangements were in such a flux during the 1980’s and 1990’s that underperformance was an unsurprising outcome.