By David Beaumont

Presentation given to the NATO Logistics Committee, 12 Nov 25

Firstly, I would like to extend my gratitude for the great privilege to speak to the members of NATO’s Logistics Committee.

I also wish to acknowledge the distinguished representatives present here today, each of whom is leading the transformation of national and alliance military logistics organisations under pressure within a dynamic strategic context.

Like many of you, I have been closely following strategic trends and analysing how these trends intersect with the ongoing task of sustaining modern military forces.

I do not mean to exaggerate but I share the view that we find ourselves at a significant point of strategic inflection. Moreover, I also share the view that the military preparedness approaches developed by defence forces must adjust; we are in a transition of preparedness planning where our militaries and alliances now tend to see that the possible imminence of war is of greater danger than the enemy capability that will be faced in such a war.[1]

It is now not enough to be prepared for crisis or conflict without a mind for what follows. As historian Cathal Nolan firmly states in The Allure of Battle, ‘[w]inning the day of battle is not enough. You have to win the campaign, then the year, then the decade.’[2] Resilience matters.

Strategic change

I am not suggesting we are navigating entirely new territory or encountering unprecedented challenges. That would be a parochial position to take.

We are at a point of inflection because we are part of a genuine change in the global security environment that we have not experienced before. This sense of ‘newness’ has forced military planners to question what it means ‘to be prepared’.

A cursory glance at NATO strategic statements, or strategic policy from my own nation, points to the realities of this changing environment. The same could be said of elsewhere, including with Australia’s own National Defence Strategy.

So what are the changes and challenges now underway?

We are in a strategic environment – both here in Europe but also in the Pacific – where the stabilising forces that ensure logistics systems are regular, efficient, and meet our preparedness needs are strained to the point where the risk of failure is increasing.

The globalised production approach that has given us shared capabilities – from aircraft to ships, sophisticated electronics to repair components – has ‘globalised’ the more defence force in equal measure. Each of our nations depends upon one another for the means of war like few other eras of history.

In terms of logistics, it is not easy to distinguish between the world within our national borders, and the world outside. Our nations are struggling to grappling with the consequences of supply-chains becoming securitised, making it immensely difficult for individual nations and their institutions to control the flow of resources upon which success in war depends.

We are caught in a paradox. On one hand we aspire for greater levels of national self-reliance and logistics autonomy, but on the other we recognise our military successes depend upon one another’s support.

If you follow Australian conversations you might observe statements from various quarters suggesting that globalised production is a strategic risk – or for some less-than-friendly nations, a source of strategic leverage – rather than being a way in which logistics efficiency or cost-effectiveness is generated.

Whatever your view, the logistics required to support forces operating in one region of the world is so bound by global connections that local or hemispherically-bounded war seems an impossibility.

No longer are we only concerned about the collective logistics capability and capacity among the armed forces of 32 nations, other allies and partners. Instead, the focus is shifting to the establishment of resilient global systems of supply that no one nation, or group of nations, could ever independently control. It is an environment that rewards agreement and consensus with the prioritised building and sharing of capability.

We watch – and for some tragically live – through conflicts where this shared logistics and industrial capacity can no longer be expressed ‘in polished procurement briefings’ but ‘tangible outputs such as shells, drones, and spare parts’ to echo the insights of academics from Australia’s War College and King’s College London.[3]

Rather than being far-away laboratories cursorily observed for the sake of conjuring new concepts for fighting wars, or to select the next ‘game-changing’ capability, these wars powerfully remind us – again – that militaries, and the logistics systems that give them strength, are supported by resilient societies that inevitably bear a tremendous political, social and economic cost to keep forces in the fight.

Collective arrangements in the ‘fight tonight’

The stark reality is that the defence forces we represent must now move from trying to predict how front-line engagements might look like, and distance themselves from the supposition that they can choose what they do on the basis of what their militaries can credibly support.

Defence forces must now focus on whole-of-nation arrangements that better enable them to harness the economic, workforce, social and institutional capacities that provide a diet commensurate to tasks that are neither planned nor forseen.

Australia’s Chief of Defence Force, Admiral David Johnston, only recently confirmed to the public that for the ADF to sustain high-intensity and large-scale operations in northern Australia, it will be impossible for the force to do this alone. He went on to state that ‘a resilient domestic industrial base with the ability to scale and innovate is essential to national security.’[4]

The scope of military requirements continues to expand, and not just because we are now preparing for larger, high-intensity, conflicts.

Sustainment requirements are driven by resource-intensive advanced weaponry, increasingly sophisticated digital infrastructure, and as mentioned earlier, supply chains of unparalleled complexity. Sustainment requirements will only be met by collective arrangements and strong civil-military partnerships in complement.

And these arrangements be ready for conflict. In a ‘contested’ logistics setting, it has become just as important that militaries give the same attention to the battle to supply, maintain, and sustain themselves, as the combat operations themselves.

So here we are at a crossroads, compelled by new pressures to re-evaluate long-held assumptions about how our militaries prepare for, and sustain, operations in times of conflict.

In this environment, the demand for militaries to be better prepared, more resilient, and ready to ‘fight tonight’ requires greater levels of communication between civil-military partners beyond broad policy statements. Demand signals to these partners are now needed, helping them to prepare.

Logistics planners, working with civil-military partners, must also consider the economic and industrial transitions nation experienced during war, as well as those that will be necessary afterwards to a part of deterring a resumption of conflict. 

But we must also be careful. We cautiously tread through a labyrinth of ideas and concepts that promise answers but are far too often confounded by logistical realities.

And this is before we attempt to treat the capability gaps resident with military logistics systems that may have been functionally emaciated, starved of the resources that necessary to prepare for military contingencies that could very well be just around the corner.

The reality is that it is exceedingly rare to find militaries – whether bespoke or part of an alliance as represented here – fully prepared for a conflict they are subjected to, or even one their nation initiates.

Martin van Creveld’s seminal study about logistics, Supplying War, once described that ‘…. most armies appear to have prepared their campaigns as best they can on an ad hoc basis, making great, if uncoordinated, efforts to gather the largest possible number of tactical vehicles, trucks of all descriptions, railway troops etc., while giving little, if any, thought to the ‘ideal’ combination that would have carried them the furthest.’[5]

It is just as rare to find militaries with the logistics resources they need prior to conflict as it is operational plans and military strategies that incorporate logistics considerations to the extent schemes of manoeuvre are shaped around what can be supplied to whom and when.    

All of this is to say we will most likely not get ‘it right’, for the problems are so significant in scale and scope that they seem intractable to the point of being untreatable. With this in mind, it may be that our work should focus less on fulfilling specific capability requirements and more on the systems that enable us to act in all of the uncertainty.

Logistics, resilience and the future

The concept of ‘resilience’ has featured prominently in my remarks, and for good reason. Its rise in military and public sector discourse reflects a growing acknowledgement that it’s impossible to anticipate every scenario or every possible combination of challenges I’ve raised earlier.

In Australia, discussions of resilience have traditionally stemmed from responses to natural disasters and health crises, rather than from national defence. Success is often perceived as being achieved when intergovernmental cooperation mechanisms work, rather than through the establishment of a credible military deterrent.

As the strategic landscape in regions like the Pacific and Europe has shifted, civil preparedness, civil-military support, and the ability to collectively withstand attacks have now entered the mainstream debate.

Logisticians have long been integral to this dialogue—perhaps more so than is commonly recognised, even among themselves. Their work, from readying forces to ensuring sustainability and resource adaptability, highlights the direct link between logistics and a military’s capacity to absorb shocks, recover, and respond effectively.

The relationship between military logistics and broader national resilience objectives has never been more pronounced. Military responsiveness in crisis hinges on access to civilian infrastructure and resources, along with established procedures for rapid mobilisation when required. If these civil systems lack resilience, the military units that rely on them will inevitably be compromised as well.

Yet, robust logistics cannot be focused solely on immediate combat readiness. Resilient approaches and sustained preparedness are now vital for maintaining operational effectiveness over potentially long periods of protracted conflict.

This means investing in and strengthening longstanding deficiencies within military logistics systems and capabilities to ensure they can perform in intense, likely regional or even global, conflict scenarios.

Simultaneously, resources must be channelled into fostering system-wide resilience—creating logistics networks that not only support operational forces as shock absorbers but also restore combat strength, serving as the foundation from which forces can recover and regroup.

Conclusion

Bold and imaginative ideas are now needed.

To paraphrase a former senior Australian Defence Associate Secretary, Brendan Sargent, we must be prepared that our responses to the strategic challenges we face will change us and our organisations. It will require facing up to institutional and political imperatives that are ‘so potentially powerful that they can blind us to aspects of the world we are seeing.’[6]

Logistics communities must adapt nonetheless. In facing the future, it is important to remember that it will be important to know what the costs of the choices we might make will be, and whether we truly understand what those choices actually are.

There cannot be bystanders in this calculus. All who share responsibility for our nation’s safety and preparedness must be involved.

Together, we can formulate alliance and national-level strategies that must speak to many different realities, and in doing so build the resilience that allows forces to adapt to circumstances beyond their control.

Ultimately, resilience is forged not in moments of ease, but through decisive action in times of uncertainty and pressure. By embracing bold ideas and remaining vigilant to the realities we face, we must also be prepared to build logistics systems and national frameworks that not only withstand the shocks of conflict and disaster, but also enable our militaries and nations to recover, adapt, and emerge stronger.

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[1] Betts, R., Military readiness: concepts, choices, consequences, Brookings, 1995, p 143

[2] Nolan, C., The Allure of Battle, Oxford University Press, UK, 2019, p 4

[3]Betz, D., Smith, M.L.R, ‘Smart weapons, dumb assumptions: Western strategic delusions meet industrial reality in Ukraine’, Military Strategy Magazine, 26 Jun 2025

[4] Johnston, D., see Navy Outlook, 1 Nov 25

[5] Van Creveld, M., Supplying War, 2^nd Edition, Cambridge University Press, UK, 2004, p236

[6] Sargent, B., ‘To see what is worth seeing: keynote speech to the Strategic and Defence Studies fiftieth anniversary dinner, 21 Jul 2026’ from Carr, A. (ed), Strategic imagination: essays in honour of Brendan Sargent, 2025