Collective Training

The trust deficit – why do we expect logistics to fail us?

By Gabrielle M. Follett.

Trust. The willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability of the ability to monitor or control that other party[1].

In a recent post in ‘From the Green Notebook’ David Beaumont noted that, for the sustainment of decisive action to be effective, logistics must be characterised by ‘trust between commanders, combat forces and logisticians’. Almost every military logistician – and no doubt the majority of our combat arms brethren – would agree.

If we accept that trust between all parties is essential to effective military logistics, why then do tactical commanders in the Australian Army generally adopt a policy of self-reliance when it comes to combat service support? At every level of the Combat Brigade supply chain – from the F Echelon through to the logistic battalion – we assume that the logistic system is almost certainly going to fail us. Moreover, as we reach back to third line logistics and beyond to the National Support Base, the decline in trust is almost proportional to the increasing geographic and C2 ‘distances’ between the elements who are supported and those supporting.

As a result, at the tactical level we deploy with a stockholding based on ‘everything we can fit in’ rather than the science of logistic planning. The repercussions are self-fulfilling: we take so much equipment and stores on our training exercises that we don’t test the logistic continuum, failing to find where it breaks and thus missing the opportunity to fix it. The lack of trust in logistic units and the supply chain is reflected in wasteful activities, hoarding of limited resources and failure to accept prudent risk. In terms of collective capability, we lose the opportunity to actually train combat and combat service support elements together, failing to build mutual understanding or respect and never affording ourselves the fortuity to be pleasantly surprised when the logistic system delivers. The result is a cultural bias that is deeply ingrained, perpetuating an often unfounded belief that our combat service support units can’t or won’t deliver what the combat arms need.

Photo by 3rd Combat Service Support Battalion, Australian Army

As logisticians, the lack of faith in the ability and skills of our logistic continuum and those of us charged with providing the support feels like enduring ‘trust deficit’. While it is generally accepted that the success or failure of combat action is dependent on a range of factors – including acceptance that the ‘enemy gets a vote’ – we approach support operations in an entirely different way. When combat operations fail, it’s because we missed information requirement X or factor Y was not available. When resupply or battlefield repair fails, it is inevitably chalked up to the perceived incompetence of the logistic unit or the inbuilt inflexibility of the system. Trust – a subjective, transactional emotion – in military logistics at the tactical level is at least partly founded on group-based stereotypes rather than heuristic experience.

In our tactical commanders there is a clear approach of ‘trust is good, but control is better’ manifesting itself in a desire not to depend on the next level of support. This has been brought to the fore in the Australian Army’s tactical combat service support restructure[2], which in January 2017 shifted part of the combat service support personnel establishment from units into the second line logistic battalion. The premise behind the new apportionment of logistic resource is that the Army cannot afford to have all of the logistic personnel it thinks it needs, and that concentrating them at Brigade level enables prioritisation and technical efficiencies for formation operations. This disposition is analogous to how mobility support and indirect fires have been managed for decades, an arrangement that comes with apparent acceptance and trust from battle group and combat team commanders. Combat commanders are comfortable – and trust that – they will receive indirect fires when they need it and if the Brigade’s apportionment of the assets is in their favour. Yet the same command and control arrangements applied to combat service support have been met with skepticism, distrust and fear.

It is not just our combat brethren that perpetuate the expectation that the military logistic system is, more than likely, going to fail its dependencies. As logisticians in first line units we promote a lack of reliance on the next level of support. We focus on ensuring our own efforts support our unit so that we mitigate any deficiencies further up the distribution or repair chain. This facet of distrust in the system stems in part from the tribal nature of our Army. The same corps and unit identities that we develop as a component of morale and combat effectiveness lead us to distrust those who are not like us. The fact that combat service support personnel in combat units give way to a form of ‘Stockholm Syndrome’ and agree wholeheartedly that units can only depend on the logistics that they own and control means we are doing little to assuage or defeat the lack of trust in the complete logistic continuum. The same approach is perpetuated in second line logistic units, where cynicism about the reliability of third line support abounds.

Compounding our ingrained cultural skepticism is a lack of proof that our logistic system can deliver the goods. We talk of exercising our logistic systems and ‘pushing them to breaking point’. Yet in our major field training activities we prioritise objectives more tangibly linked with joint land combat at the expense of actually testing our combat service support. Instead of considering the ‘four Ds’[3] during exercise design, we can rarely afford the funding to position our third line logistics at the distance needed to generate realistic lines of communication, meaning that the force support and brigade support elements end up in close proximity to each other. The exercise duration– driven by concern about how long we are away from home locations – is short and finite, inevitably supporting a self-sufficient approach. Our ‘destinations’ are well known to us through the geography of well-trodden training areas, meanwhile ‘demand’ is shaped by the finite nature of the activity and set training objectives. But it’s a false economy; the fact is the cost of not training with realistic lines of supply, reasonable demand and extended duration will be felt when Australia is next required to lead an expeditionary multinational force in our region. What we don’t learn now in training will be painfully apparent on operations when the consequences are much higher.

Photo by 3rd Combat Service Support Battalion, Australian Army

Trust is a belief in the reliability or ability of something and is the measure of the quality of a relationship. We work hard at unit and formation levels to build these relationships, training and planning together. Within a combat brigade, the relationships between commanding officers are almost universally very strong. As a logistic battalion commander, I often receive emails and calls from peers who tell me how professional and capable my soldiers are. Some of these calls carry a genuine (and perhaps concerning) tone of surprise, but all of them speak to the understanding that these commanders have of the importance of logistics. Likewise, our senior leaders frequently highlight how, as they become more senior, they increasingly spend more time focusing on logistics. Yet despite this leadership, emphasis and quality of relationships between commanders, our organisational belief in the reliability and ability of the logistic continuum remains low.

Why haven’t we built this trust? Firstly, trust must be based on demonstrated competence. As previously noted, we aren’t generating collective opportunities that enable combat service support units to demonstrate competence, or to quantifiably expose the shortfalls so we can win resources to fix them. This requires more than simply limiting what each unit deploys with on – it necessitates acceptance that if we do expose logistic shortfalls they may degrade or prevent the achievement of combat arms training objectives. While we collectively believe that our logistic resources are inadequate, we do not have the organisational maturity to accept that training to expose such shortfalls may be necessary to prove the requirement for resources to fix it.

At an individual level, we wait too long to teach our junior commanders that combat service support is a crucial part of the combined arms team, equal to the other components. The Australian Army Logistic Officers Intermediate Course and Combat Officers Advanced Course come together for a short period to conduct a staff planning activity. Although badged as combined training, the lead up lessons remain separate, the problem sets are not actually constrained by logistic culminating points and the simulation system does not consume logistic effort beyond a rudimentary level. Without a mature individual training framework that treats the combat and logistic elements of the problem equally, our combat arms officers walk away with the perception that logistics is a sideshow of limited consequence.

To address the trust deficit we would do well to note that the United Kingdom’s doctrine lists the first principle of logistics as ‘collective responsibility’[4]. As logisticians, the onus is on us to communicate the imperative and the risks and to create opportunities to show what combat service support elements can actually do. We must recognise that trust is reciprocal, transactional and based on demonstrated competence. We have to get past our own arrogance and believe that when a battle group demands for something at short notice, they have good reason for doing so. We are as guilty of distrusting our dependencies as they are of distrusting us. As the supporting arm, combat service support units must accept that inevitably and rightly, the dependency defines success.

Our collective challenge is to build trust in unpredictable environments, where we are part of a continuum in which we are not always the number one priority and definitely aren’t pulling all of the levers. Transparent honesty is essential to build trust so that when we truly do require lead times or genuinely can’t meet a requirement, our relationship with our dependencies is robust enough to accept that some things truly aren’t possible. Trust must be earned and earned quickly, as the cost of not demonstrating competence or exposing logistic capability shortfalls so they can be addressed could, without exaggeration, be counted in lives.

Gabrielle Follett is an Australian Army officer and a current logistic battalion commander in the 3rd Brigade. She has served in command appointments and staff appointments at formation and force level, as an instructor at the Royal Military College – Duntroon, and at the strategic level in Army Headquarters and Australian Defence Headquarters. She has operational experience as a combat service support team commander, operations officer, Joint Task Force J5, and as a task group S4 in Tarin Kot, Afghanistan.

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[1] Mayer, R.C., Davis, J.H., Schooman, F.D. An integrative model of organisational trust, The Academy of Management Review Vol 20, No 3 (July), 1995, pp 709-734

[2] Known as the ‘Combat Service Support Concept of Operations’ or ‘CSS CONOPs’.

[3] Australian land warfare doctrine describes logistic planning factors known as the ‘four Ds’ – destination, demand, distance and duration. Developing doctrine expands this to ‘five Ds’ with the addition of ‘dependency’.

[4] UK Army Doctrine Publication Land Operations, Chapter 10 – Sustaining Operations

Trust, discipline and accepting risk – the principles and art of sustaining decisive action

Picture by Australian Army

By David Beaumont.

Joe Byerly’s ‘From the Green Notebook’ (a WordPress blog, with a Facebook site) is conducting a series-based ‘Decisive Action week’. The posts are describing the ways in which armies prepare themselves for operations and exercises. It was opened earlier this week with a comment from CG TRADOC, US Army, which is well worth a quick read.

David Beaumont’s post is aimed with commanders in mind, and offers three key characteristics which commanders must develop in their teams prior to operations. These are trust, discipline and an acceptance of risk. The first refers to the relationship between logisticians and commanders, and reflects ideas from Steven Cornell’s post, Establishing an ‘unequal dialogue’. Logistic discipline underwrites the capacity of a force to sustain its tempo and maintain flexibility. Finally, ‘risk acceptance’ refers to the taking of appropriate risks based upon a commanders, and logisticians, detailed understanding of the logistic context of the forces. This has been a theme carried in a number of Logistics In War posts.

In the second half of the post, it outlines four principle questions a commander must ask when she or he plans a mission or task. Based upon a number of ideas contained within logistic theory, these questions simplify the logistic problem and encourage commanders and logisticians to think laterally about who, where, why and how forces will be sustained.

By David Beaumont ‘In war, mistakes and normal; errors are usual; information is seldom complete, often inaccurate, and frequently misleading. Success is won, not by personnel and materiel in prime condition, but by the debris of an organisation worn by the strain of campaign and shaken by the shock of battle. The objective is attained, […]

via #DAweek: The Principles and Art of Sustaining Decisive Action — From the Green Notebook

Survive first, sustain later: exercising dispersed logistics in the close fight

By Mark Baldock

A logistics element not capable of surviving and operating in a threat environment is a battlefield liability. Armies knew long before ‘multi-domain battle’ was developed that logistic capabilities are easy to identify, target and destroy. They are the soft underbelly of a fighting formation, and if a formations organic logistic elements are destroyed by indirect fires or direct attack, any combat forces remaining are usually quick to defeat. However, it is my opinion and experience that in order to ensure that the combat capabilities of formations receive due attention during exercises, we don’t tend to assess the ability of logistics elements to protect themselves. This risks lulling land forces into a false sense of security, when lessons from recent operations suggest we should be doing more to achieve the opposite.

During 2016, the logistic battalion I commanded – the 1^st Combat Service Support Battalion (1 CSSB) – deployed to the Cultana Training Area in the desert of South Australia to participate in Exercise Hamel 2016. This annual exercise is conducted by the Australian Army to ‘certify’ the combat formation prior to it being declared ‘ready’ for operations. 1 CSSB, being the organic CSS battalion of the formation, was also being tested for its readiness to deploy. Although the unit was expected to meet different criteria before being declared ‘ready’, it was my opportunity to experiment and assess a variety of ways in which I could, within the constraints of the exercise, improve upon survivability of 1 CSSB. Moreover, it was an opportunity to consider ways in which a large, formation-level logistic unit, could sustain operations in a contemporary, albeit simulated, environment.

This article describes the methods I undertook to improve the battlefield survivability of 1 CSSB during Exercise Hamel 2016, and the consequences of these attempts. There were many exercise limitations that influenced my assessments, meaning that the observations I describe here are not exhaustive. However, I offer this example to describe my own opinion and experience, and to promote further discussion.

Deploying the battalion within Cultana Training Area, South Australia. Personal photo.

The philosophy for the training of the battalion before the exercise could be summarized as ‘survive first, sustain later’. However, it was a philosophy that I also applied to the force structure and disposition of the battalion during the exercise. After assessing the capability and intent of the enemy, it was assessed that the greatest threat to the unit’s overall survivability would be posed by indirect and aerial delivery weapons. Reducing the risk associated with this threat drove force posture, encouraging me to disperse my battalion by allocating forces forward. This approach was taken because the geography of Cultana Training Area was relatively small and sparsely vegetated; I had no opportunity to ‘hide’ the battalion. Furthermore, as a formation logistic unit sustaining front-line forces, my unit was well in range of expected enemy artillery. This meant that the unit was detectable and targetable by everything on the battlefield. In the end, survivability had more to do with risk management than any other factor.

Mobility and dispersion are key for logistic assets to survive on a battlefield where you cannot hide. Geography favored the enemy in this case as the terrain offered little concealment. Noting the unit’s signature and the ability of deep strike weapons and mobile artillery to close ground quicker than a CSSB can redeploy; smaller, more mobile, dispersed logistics nodes were created. Notice to move was reduced as much as possible, with my subordinate commanders needing to be prepared for short-notice movements to avoid threats. Extra resources were allocated, from the transportation elements I would normally hold within the main battalion position, if this could not be achieved.

In the end three smaller, mobile, CSS Teams (CSSTs) had been formed to support the three different battlegroups of the brigade. This is not an unusual practice as a CSSB always deployed a component of its capability forward to support combat forces more directly. However, the traditionally larger Brigade Maintenance Area (BMA)[1] position was dispersed and diluted amongst these CSST’s as much as possible. I believed that this still left the position too large, and a vulnerable target to the adversary. I never sought to reintegrate the forward CSST’s into my main battalion position for fear of exacerbating the problem and making the BMA even larger. This approach allowed for a loss of one of three logistic elements without critical impact on capability of the combat brigade. If either a CSST or the BMA were destroyed, the combat brigade could still be sustained for at least two to three days, meaning there would be opportunity to reallocate logistic elements.

The Brigade Maintenance Area (BMA). Photo by 1 Combat Brigade, Australian Army

Observations

The dispersal of logistic forces forward was effectively achieved. However, new problems had started to emerge; problems that should not be surprising to any logistic commander. The primary weakness of smaller, dispersed forces that I saw on exercise is that they became more vulnerable to direct attack and infiltration. Troop concentrations within the logistic element are reduced, and defensive weapons – typically in small numbers within a CSSB – were spread thinly. I was fortunate that extra weapon systems were reallocated across the brigade to overcome deficiencies, but the unit was still caught short on a number of instances. It was particularly vulnerable to direct attacks by enemy cavalry who could exploit the defensive ‘gaps’ created by dispersal. This led me to believe that for dispersion to work effectively, each logistic element had to be well-resourced with equipment (especially weapons), communications and transportation capabilities to enable movement from the outset.

Although dispersal introduced its own vulnerabilities, there was no mission failed by a battlegroup or the brigade because of a failure in its sustainment. On the contrary, the dispersion of the battalion enhanced the responsiveness of the formations logistic system because the lines of communication were usually short. Similarly, as robust teams were force-assigned to battlegroups, the combat forces were well resourced to be able to complete their assigned missions and tasks. My decision to focus on allocating forces to the battlegroups, however, meant that it was particularly difficult to concentrate my battalion’s capabilities for specific brigade level tasks. I suspect that this might have become a significant problem for the combat brigade had the notional operation continued longer than it did, or if the brigade had conduct major combat maneuvers.

I found that the success of a dispersed, mobile model hinges on foresight and responsiveness. Foresight naturally drives the responsiveness. It requiring logisticians to understand the how the combat force might maneuver and have the administrative proficiency to determine what their requirements might be Furthermore, foresight is greatly enhanced by effective communication within the formation. This includes routine reports and returns and also direct liaison with combat elements and other logistic units. Similarly, where communications are of a poor standard the ability to apply foresight becomes limited; in some instances, I had to overcompensate when assigning logistic elements to battlegroups because it was extremely difficult to predict their exact requirements. TThe high pace at which combat battlegroups reorganised during the exercise led to erratic sustainment requirements, and negatively influenced the CSSB’s capacity to apply foresight.

Observing the movement of logistic forces. Personal photo.

Foresight and responsiveness are at their heart command and control issues, and are improved by measures all military logisticians should be familiar with. Although the application of ‘mission command’ led to good outcomes, simple things such as accuracy in reports and returns, staff ‘battle-tracking,’ monitoring of the maneuver of other units within the brigade, routine communication and planning, as well as effective liaison between units within the combat brigade make a bigger difference. Control measures were especially important when the brigade maneuvered rapidly, with logistic forces dispersing across the battlefield. This includes control of routes and locations, ensuring that all logistic elements weren’t moving at the same time, and enforcing greater input from Brigade to better understand friendly force movements. In the long term, new technologies and improved ‘battlefield operating pictures’ may improve the situation. Although I may have left Exercise Hamel 2016 with the view that dispersing logistic elements in an area of operations without compromising operations was challenging, the application of relatively simple tactics, techniques and procedures did much to overcome problems.

Logistic units, particularly at the formation level, shouldn’t expect to be operating as a massed capability kept well out of range of enemy threats, especially artillery. I think that is now, and probably always has been, an impossibility on the battlefield. Instead, logistic personnel must learn to operate in an area of considerable threat, and they must be prepared to take acceptable risks to ensure battlefield survivability. This should continue to be a major focus of unit and formation level collective training exercises. Smaller, disaggregated, mobile logistic forces reduce detection signatures and lessen the payoff associated with targeting larger logistic positions, bases and ‘nodes’. I am glad that I was given an opportunity to experiment with ideas that have been discussed among logisticians in my Army for many years, and to challenge doctrine and procedures that applied rigidly. This opportunity created considerable challenges for my logistic battalion, but the lessons learned were useful. With ongoing refinement, and further investment in terms of collective training activities, I think logisticians will be well on the path to finding effective ways to survive in the forward areas of the contemporary battlefield.

[1] The Brigade Maintenance Area is the ground on which the concentrated assets of the unit occupies. It is rearward positioned, and the primary logistic ‘node’ for the combat brigade.

Mark Baldock is a serving Australian Army officer, and commanded the 1st Combat Service Support Battalion over the period 2015-2016. The thoughts here are his own, and are offered to stimulate conversation and debate.

Logistics In War is looking for similar articles which examine how military logistics is applied on operations or exercises; if you feel you can contribute to the discussion, please contact us on the link above. Follow us at Twitter: @logisticsinwar and Facebook : @logisticsinwar. Share to grow the network and continue the discussion.

A Response to ‘Logistics in War’ – Sustaining the multi-domain battle

By James Davis

You may have seen exerts of this post in the comments to previous articles, or at James Davis’s personal blog ‘The Armchair Colonel’. This post, reflecting a succinct list of change activities required within the Australian Army, is an edited version of a response made to ‘Sustaining the multi-domain battle’.

Whilst not my intention, there is a risk that this post will creating an unsightly blog duel. This is contrary to its purpose which is to move the debate on logistics in future warfare from the conceptual to the actual. I think, maybe a little too boldly, that the Chief is in my corner in this endeavour. In 2015 he prefaced the Australian Army Modernisation plan with the words:

“Change is inevitable. It is tempting to believe that the future of warfare will be very different from its past. People are similarly predisposed to imagine future war through the prism of recent experience. So contemporary terrorism, insurgency and intra-state warfare, compounded by seemingly revolutionary technological transformation, appear to foreshadow some comprehensive change to warfare. Continuity is inevitable too. Since the end of the First World War, the causes of battlefield success have been remarkably stable. In our never-ending quest for improvement and advantage over our potential foes, we are prone to lose sight of continuities and exaggerate the effect of change. “

In Sustaining the multi-domain battle my friend and classmate Dave Beaumont has challenged readers to ride roughshod over standing assumptions about logistics and consider how they might operate in ‘multi-domain battle’. I don’t intend to dwell on multi-domain battle which is, in summary, an operational concept to create ‘a hyper-joint’ Army that will both operate in, and affect all other domains in conjunction with the other services. This translates to ground forces exploiting and enabling operations across air, sea, cyber, space, and the electro-magnetic spectrum.

However, as the Chief notes, it is important to think about the next big step and concurrently keep a lock on the continuities. In the future, our adversaries will continue to reduce our logistics capacity as cheaply as they can. This will mean improvised explosive devices, ambushes, small scale raids and beyond line of sight fires (I include drones dropping bombs etc in this category). Attack through the electro-magentic spectrum and cyberspace will be as certain as they are now. Army must respond to this reality in this decade and not wait for a step change.

The work of Admiral Jackie Fisher, Royal Navy, might serve as a useful analogy. Fisher is best known for the technological transformation of the Royal Navy between 1902 and 1915 and the development of the Dreadnought class of ships. This change could be considered his Multi-domain battle transformation. He is less well known for the tactical and cultural revolution he drove as Commander of the Mediterranean fleet from 1899 to 1902. Of this time, Lord Hankey (no the name isn’t made up), a Captain of the Royal Marines, commented:

“Before his (Fisher’s) arrival the topics and arguments of the officers messes were mainly confined to matters as the cleaning of paint and brasswork and the getting out of torpedo nets and anchors, and similar trivialities. After a year in Fisher’s regime these were forgotten and replaced by incessant controversies on tactics, strategy, gunnery, torpedo warfare etc. It was a veritable renaissance and affected every officer in the fleet.”

Even Fisher’s most ardent critic, C.B. Beresford, conceded a list of 20 actions Fisher had taken to improve the fleet. Most of these did not involve technology; they were based on work, realistic training and breaking traditions. What follows are a number of suggestions for Army to respond to the threats that we know will persist; a foundation for transformation…..should it come.

Photo by Australian Army – Combat Logistic Patrol in Afganistan

Change Culture

Dispense with the idea of teeth and tail. Everyone fights, logistic soldiers don’t have to be as good at killing as combat soldiers but that must be as hard to kill. Armour and Infantry personnel and training institutions must support logistics senior non-commissioned officers in their training of logistics soldiers and officers to use armoured fighting vehicles (AFV) and weapons. Why can’t a vehicle mechanic, qualified as an Army instructor, and with an AFV crew commander qualification, teach other logistics soldiers to use an AFV?

Move from a “Safety First” to a “Safety Plus” Culture. A simple example – in armoured units fuel only gets pumped in the middle of the night so a soldier must know how to use the fuel pump safely without light. Army school training should reflect this practice rather than legislation regarding the mandatory use of white light when pumping fuel. The enemy is considerably more dangerous than fuel spills. In a similar vein, the fear of heat illness has resulted in a loss of water discipline which in turn has increased demand. These are but two of many examples.

Improve the skills of vehicle commanders. There are too many ‘lemmings’ on the battlefield that create targets by the way they drive, the spacing they adopt relative to other vehicles and what they do when they stop (sit inside with the air conditioning running). If everyone can’t drive at night the the whole force is compromised. The Armoured Corps must help others to improve.

Decentralise

Doctrinal Change. There must be an idea other than Brigade Maintenance Area. This will require better C2 and for combat units to have lower expectations of response time.

Be self reliant. Carry spare parts and maintenance personnel in fighting (‘F’) echelons. Up-skill AFV drivers to perform more maintenance and demand that combat systems degrade gracefully, ie. the turret electrics may not work but the gun can be laid and fired manually – train to do this.

Reduce Demand. Review block scales and entitlements. Do Australian Soldiers really need 600grams of fresh meat a day on operations? What is the minimum amount of rations required to sustain a force? See comments on water discipline.

Leaders across all of Army’s Brigades and Training Centres own this change but it might also need a Jackie Fisher – a violent reformer. As Sir Reginald Bacon commented “Fisher was a living winnowing machine. He welcomed suggestions from all who possessed ideas. These he assimilated, separated the wheat from the chaff. All grist was welcome at his mill.”

‘The Armchair Colonel’, James Davis, is a serving Australian Army officer and former Commanding Officer of the 2nd Cavalry Regiment. He blogs at http://armchaircolonel.blogspot.com.au, where this post was originally published, and can be followed on Twitter @j_adavis

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Support Squadron Headquarters, 2nd Cavalry Regiment, 2015 – scared of the drones and helicopters!