Joint operations is not a new concept, nor is joint logistics. Militaries have been integrating the resources of two or more Services, and other supporting agencies, to maximise their combat potential and operational performance since ancient times. Over the last two years there has been considerable discussion about joint warfare as Western militaries consider their preparations; the concept of ‘multi-domain battle’ has been an important rubric for the necessary reinvigoration of joint warfare at the tactical and operational levels of war. In the last week we have seen joint warfare in full display as a significant coalition amphibious operation during the combined and joint Exercise Talisman Sabre 2017. While we are enthusiastic to discuss joint warfare, or tactical activities as part of a joint operation, less attention is directed to joint logistics – logistics which is typically engaged with activity at the operational and strategic levels of war.
With this in mind, Logistics In War is seeking authors for future posts on two topics:
Joint logistics and logistics at the operational and strategic levels of war.
To paraphrase Thomas Kane in Military logistics and strategic performance, joint logistics is like oatmeal and chicken soup – everyone agrees it is good for you, but nobody is enthusiastic to say much more about it than that. Joint logistics, and logistics at the strategic level in particular, can be the most challenging, frustrating, intellectually demanding form of logistics undertaken. The need to integrate activities between Services, often with competing needs, resources and strengths, defence and civilian agencies, the commercial sector and the national support base creates a complex mix for any logistician, senior leader or executive to control and organise. Logistics In War is interested in posts that outline challenges encountered in joint and strategic logistics, leadership lessons, strategic logistics issues and any other matters that may help to shine a light on this topic.
Lessons from exercising in the joint and combined environment – Exercise Talisman Sabre 2017.
We are seeking lessons learned from logisticians and others who have participated in the biennial Exercise Talisman Sabre 2017. These may be lessons relevant to tactical performance, right up to the planning for, and conduct of, amphibious lodgement. Training, pre-deployment and reconstitution activities – any and all topics reflecting upon lessons learned from this exercise involving the ADF, NZDF, all branches of the US military, as well as other partners. Too often lessons learned are unshared – now’s your opportunity to deliver your experiences to a wide audience.
If you are interested in writing on either topic, please read over the link and contact us at logisticsinwar@outlook.com by 31 July 2017. Based upon your support, a requested submission date will be confirmed.
Share widely, and to all who might be interested in contributing.
This comment isn’t going to endear me to the blog owner, but the ADF lacks strategic lift, and there is no such thing as ‘operational level’…though everyone writes about it.
LikeLike