Joint Logistics

Building a better prepared Australian Defence Force after the Defence Strategic Review – supply-chains and logistics and the way in which both improve military resilience

This is the third and final part of a presentation given at the Australian – New Zealand Defence Logistics Conference during June 2023. The theme of the conference was ‘supply-chain resilience’.

National Defence: Defence Strategic Review, the Australian Government response to the ‘independently conducted’ Defence Strategic Review (DSR) was released to the public on 24 April 2023, and an Australian defence ‘community’ primarily interested on its recommendations for the Australian Defence Force’s (ADF) capability mix. The review, and statement which followed, portends sweeping changes to the Defence Integrated Investment Plan and to the force structure and the roles of the ADF’s Services consequently. Our understanding of what it entails suffers for the fact that many of us will never see the full, classified, version of the DSR prepared in advance of the Government’s policy statement.

What is particularly important, however, is the emphasis given to the ADF’s logistics capabilities, functions, and concepts in creating the conditions for a better-prepared ADF. National Defence’s emphasis on logistics is clearly more than usual when compared to other Government policy documents of recent years, though this emphasis comes from an exceptionally low base. Supply chain resilience is, of course, a part of this narrative – as we are reminder every time we hear about guided-weapons or military fuels. Although the ADF’s logistics requirements extend beyond such critical supplies, National Defence suggests that the traditional focus on logistics through the lens of capability acquisition and sustainment has – perhaps – transitioned a more helpful narrative concerning the role of logistics and national-level preparedness.

Logistics and force posture

As I mentioned earlier in this series, logistics is the connective tissue of force posture, ensuring the viability of forces by the timely provision of personnel, materiel, stores and supplies. Force posture is underpinned by supply chains, distribution and the technical systems – military and civilian – that ensure that the right ‘stuff’ gets to the right location. National Defence requires the ADF to develop a northern Australia network of bases ‘to provide a platform for logistics support, denial and deterrence’ (p19). While this requirement centres on the mechanics of basing by focussing on air bases, shipyards and barracks – all of which must be dispersed and part of a resilient network with in-built redundancy to enable integrated defence. Fuel and ammunition feed into the discussion of force posture, and the importance of exercises to build ‘preparedness including minimum viable improvements in key areas’ is also clear (pp 78-80).

Importantly, force posture must be underpinned by stockholding concepts that ensure sufficient resources are kept, and transport management plans and policies and concepts for working with national partners when needed. The Australian community must be engaged such that logistics plans are developed conscious of local constraints on the staging or mounting of forces, and a full spectrum of Government agencies involved to ensure ‘resilience’ results.

Secondly, force posture is really about force projection, and is not only concerned with the permanent housing of forces. Debates about force posture are meaningless if they do not consider factors such as the receiving of forces at particular locations, equipping and preparing them for deployment or movement, to consolidating forces at forward locations relative to threats, and the command and control measures required to ensure this happens in a well-coordinated and efficient manner.

During Operation Warden, as per part two of this series, ADF force posture – despite its emphasis on operations in Australia’s north – was not complemented with the logistics infrastructure. Forces concentrating in Darwin rapidly exhausted civilian and military sources of supply, and there was insufficient administrative infrastructure to support their mounting. Supply would be assured by unit CO’s who, sending staff to local hardware stores and other shops, would obtain what was needed there and then. Naturally, supply ran out in Darwin quite quick!

Points and ‘mounting’ locations should be chosen to act as places where logistics control can be exerted at a time of crisis – thus avoiding situations such as this. Designated commanders can manage the influx of civilian and military resources necessary to support later military operations. As mentioned earlier, these sites work as ‘pressure release valves’ for supply-chains during crises and allow forces to prepare before moving – or reconstitution if needed. In the case of Operation Warden, a local operational headquarters – HQ NORCOM – was made responsible for coordination which in turn greatly improved the logistics support available.

Theatre logistics system

A section on ‘theatre logistics’ in National Defence is arguably more practically relevant to ADF in the short term, though to resolve capability gaps in ADF logistics capability and capacity will require a consistent pattern of investment over a long-term program. There will be pressure to deliver results in the short term – the DSR portends a great acceleration of the ADF’s logistics programs. There are risks within this acceleration.

Finally, because militaries tend to underinvest in logistics capabilities during times of peace, a sudden burst of financial profligacy can result in hasty decisions that result in the inefficient – potentially ineffective – allocation of funds to resolve what is believed to be the most critical investment issue at any one time. Before money is committed, deep analysis of the logistics system must be undertaken – an analysis a disjointed approach to capability investment can affect the way in which the components of the overall logistics system works – creating inefficiencies and affecting the realisation of effectiveness.

Secondly, any investment must be matched with the right policies, plans and concepts that will ensure a generational shift logistics preparedness and resilience. As prospective logistics systems are complex and complicated, with multiple owners who have different resourcing and management priorities, it can be difficult for militaries to coherently approach the redevelopment of their logistics processes and in the development of capability.

The recognition that Government, and Defence, must reinvest in Defence logistics and health capacity is instructive to a more serious view of preparedness than in the past – as alluded to above. These capabilities are fundamental to ‘unlocking’ the ADF’s true potential. However, it is important to take the time and effort to ensure the investment is appropriately spent – for any investment in logistics resilience tends to be – unfortunately – inconsistently expressed.

The relationship between logistics and preparedness

The idea of accelerated preparedness contained with the DSR speaks – with a touch of drama mind you – to concepts such as mobilisation, force scaling and force expansion. These are ideas that are fundamentally logistics-related in their nature, but also reflect a view that the assumption that having forces available at the outset of a conflict is not as realistic measure of overall preparedness as it might be.

That there should be a ‘reshaping and growth of the national and Defence logistics and health workforce … to improve national resilience’ is important. We can infer from this statement that the authors of the DSR did not think that ‘national resilience’ was where it should be.

The idea of Accelerated Preparedness, recognises the essentiality of the national support base, and national resilience, to military performance. Guided-weapons and fuel enterprises are the tip of a proverbial iceberg with respect to the type of national support arrangements needed to insure logistics sovereignty. These initiatives are part of developing supply chain resilience. However, Accelerated Preparedness requires an investment in the ability of the ADF to enunciate how national and international strategic logistics issues are arranged, how such arrangements are managed, and what relationships should be leveraged. This will be done so through a reinvigorated idea of ‘national support’.

It’s relevant to note that the concept of national support actually has an international component – depending upon how you view what the ‘national support base’ is. It depends on integration beyond it – older definitions of ‘national support base’ which we might include in our study of the concept include the role of alliance partners, coalitions, international supply-chains and other sources of support in creating a ‘resilience’ centric outcome. Arrangements and agreements – such as will be discussed this week between participants of this conference – help develop mutually beneficial supply and support arrangements that complement, if not enhance, what we can do alone.

Interoperable logistics creates strategic resilience and responsiveness. However, it will not be improved unless we take time to resource its achievement. It is important that interoperability should now take an increasingly strategic tone at a time where we are preparing for the next operation. Improved strategic logistics interoperability is not a way to avoid the development costly logistics capabilities for favour of establishing dependant relationships. It’s a way that partners can support one another more readily, giving them options before, during and post-crisis that they may not have had before. In a particularly competitive strategic environment, this approach is not only important but patently necessary, and a means to gain advantage over potential adversaries.

Conclusion

It is quite clear that logistics, preparedness and resilience are mingling in a broad conversation about the modes and means of military power at a time of substantial geopolitical change. Supply chain resilience is a critical strategic concern for militaries to monitor, but it is also a fundamental component to the way in which militaries create, prepare and deploy forces. Naturally, our current interest in the topic is well deserved.

It is important that we work through the semantics of the matter as the ADF and NZDF reorient themselves. Doing so may engender further conversations that ultimately change the preparedness cultures that were created to support the operations of a different time.

Resilience is about adaptability, resistance to shock, and about options for subsequent operational action. It is about capability depth, supporting systems, logistics and capacity – and in the context of this conference – a supply chain network as a buffer. In an operational context, resilience speaks to the capacity of a force to maintain its freedom of action, and for commanders the freedom of decision.

Resilience in logistics, and most certainly in terms of supply chains, requires redundancy and a good sense of risks which could be realised at a time of crisis. The ability to identify what is happening where, to vector in support from different sources, so to reconstitute support where supply chains have fractured or under strain, characterises resilient supply chains as much as it characterises resilient military logistics. 

Established effectively, sources of resilience, create considerable strategic advantages. A resilient nation might be more speedily mobilised, or adapt to strategic surprise in the context of a range of contingencies. A military with reliable access to what it needs can respond quicker to a broader range of events and sustain its operations for much longer. Resilience is also underpinned by interoperability and logistics arrangements between partners with shared interests.

As we consider how our respective militaries work to better prepare themselves for future challenges, it is worth remembering the idea of logistics preparedness. Anything that is developed must be done so with the right plans and policies in mind, the organisation structured appropriately and resourced needed, with logistics capabilities well-resourced and integrated, and with a regime of exercising and assessments conducted to assure responsiveness. These factors are also a good way of looking at supply-chain resilience – let alone any other factor – that might significantly impact an approach to logistics at a time of crisis.  

Thankyou for reading this series: Part one and Part two can be found at the links.

Learning to live in a logistician’s world – strategic logistics and the future of military resilience

This is the first part of a presentation given at the Australian – New Zealand Defence Logistics Conference during June 2023. This conference convened to discuss supply chain resilience at a time of strategic competition.

By David Beaumont.

There is little doubt that the topics of logistics and supply-chain resilience court conversations beyond that of military logistics communities. COVID-19 pandemic-related supply-chain disruptions brought the topic of global logistics and supply chains to the fore, with the consequences of scarcity affecting individuals at a personal level. The pandemic revealed the fragility of the global economic order upon which our wealth and security depends for some, yet others saw the economic bounce-back as a reflection of the overall resilience of globalised approaches to logistics. Optimism may have faltered in early 2022, when the Russian invasion of Ukraine exacerbated impacted the worlds logistics struggles while revealing the state of the defence industrial and technology base as being unprepared for anything other than small-scale operations and ‘business as usual’. Military planners, already considering the ‘so what’s’ of a perilous logistics milieu defined by scarcity, also saw that they had to account for attrition in war – despite decades in which their operational concepts rarely treated supply, transportation, maintenance and health care as anything other than second-order issues amid the glitz and glamour of combined arms manoeuvre, blue-water naval power, long-range ‘strike’, integrated air and missile defence and warfare in the cyber and space domains.

For us in the southern hemisphere of this dangerous world, conflict in Europe nor the aftereffects of the pandemic are but the start of our military logistics problems. The potential for more serious conflicts in the Pacific region is being considered at a time where de-globalisation is underway. Strategic competition has economic and commercial overtones, with sanctions and trade restrictions used as tools of coercion or – as with China’s Belt and Road initiative – a way to form tight strategic and geoeconomic relationships in the region. The securitisation of global logistics has proceeded at a rapid pace, and we now see Western nations try to decouple their technology and industrial base from a dependence on less-friendly nations (or outright strategic competitors) while creating new arrangements to share knowledge and capacity.

We, as military logisticians and a small proportion of larger discussions about national security in our own nations, are concerned with where things are made and by whom. A litany of problems leap out at us as the trend of the securitisation, if not militarisation, of supply-chains gains momentum.   Munitions production and markets have shown to be operating well below the capacity desired, and their resupply attaining Government-level interest in a way unseen in years. Naval power has become a virtual adjunct to maritime and supply-chain security as the commerce which gives our nations life demands the protection of fleets of ships that themselves are the product globalised industrial capacity. Concern about the movement of fuels through potential conflict zones, or the production of ‘rare-earth’ minerals and microchips, proliferates in the media and popular discussion, as if it is the only problem we’ve discovered in a post-pandemic reflection. But there’s more to be concerned about. The complex supply chains of repair parts are being unpicked by analysis which shows the very equipment we depend upon is linked to the factories of strategic competitors in a web of logistics transactions that the best of us barely understand.

Robust international partnerships to spread industrial risks and induce alliance-based resilience are now being sought. Australia’s F-35 Joint Strike Fighter capability is emlematic of how consortia-based approaches to production and sustainment now tie capability development with global supply-chains in a characteristically new way. Western nations are at a point where next-generation technology is at an expense beyond even the wealthiest to produce alone. Complexities in this approach, however, conspire with other supply chain risks to create vulnerabilities which might compromise the materiel, force posture and preparedness decisions of militaries in turn. On one hard shared production allows us to realise military capability, but shared production diversifies supply-chain risks to the point further fragility emerges.

We worry about potential conflicts and the prospect of battles to be fought over lines of communication or to secure new routes, and we now look at access to distant regions of the world for national vitality, supply chain security, or lines of communication for potential enemies on the move. More importantly, we worry about how our militaries will respond at a time of crisis, and at a time where these militaries have not had the luxury of time to predict exactly what it needs and when.

These worries are shared in Defence establishments around the world. In Australia, we now look at the recently published National Defence: Defence Strategic Review to see logistics as an issue that has interested Government enough to direct significant actions in Defence to occur. Although the requirement to create a guided weapons enterprise has captured the limelight, the publicised alignment of preparedness with ADF logistics capacity is more important in terms of overall narratives. I’ll provide a few thoughts on the implications of the DSR for ADF logistics in later parts of this presentation.

The idea of capability sustainment is moving beyond the management of a funding line over a whole-of-life use of a particular platform, to one which more comprehensively considers supply and stockholdings.  Awareness about substantial logistics shortfalls is growing, as we increasingly recognise that we’ve been deploying forces on the basis of what we can sustain at a time where choice is possible.  Not only is there a conversation about the resilience of defence forces facing the potential of conflict just years ahead, but resilience in the context of the various factors that influence the capability and the capacity of these forces to go to war is a topic of mainstream debate.

It is already evident to the audience that well-prepared and resilient defence forces depend upon a range of logistics factors. A logistically prepared force requires appropriate resourcing and force structure, logistics concepts and plans to be developed, the identification of the right accountable officers and management artefacts, quality materiel held in the right scale, and a military organisation that is well-practiced in the logistics conditions and requirements of portended conflicts. Logistics preparedness is not only about having the right ‘stuff’, but the organisations, processes and behaviours which allow us to efficiently and effectively resource war.

If we want to disassemble logistics into constituent parts we can talk about supply-chains we can describe capabilities including control networks and information systems, nodes, industrial support, transportation and production and the way they ensure military units can do what they are meant to do. We can talk about supply depots, where they are positioned, ‘mounting bases’ and ‘cargo consolidation points’ as well as a myriad of other issues that determine what goes where and in what condition.

Perhaps, soon, logistics will be seen as more than a collection of jumbled-together pieces of kit, a tapestry of installations, and groups of people. It is a system of connections that define military power more profoundly than any other, for even the most powerful weapon is little more than a monument to vainglory absent that which brings it to life. Supply-chains are the ‘lifeblood of war’ to paraphrase Falklands Islands veteran Major General Julian Thompson; they are arteries through which materiel moves, at a pace which determines strategic tempo or assures availability and preparedness. If we view supply-chains as part of a logistics framework around how militaries overcome the dual tyrannies of time and space, positioning that which is needed where and when, we can see how important supply-chains – if not logistics more broadly – really is.

Part two will be published shortly.

The Australian Defence Force and industry support to operations – is it time for a new ‘national support agenda’?

By David Beaumont.

This is the final post from the LIW archives on strategic logistics and logistics challenges prior to the Australia & New Zealand Defence Logistics Conference.

In 2016, the Australian Government released its 2016 Defence White Paper and the supplemental Defence Industry Policy Statement. Industry Statements signify Government intent to Australian Defence industry, and like strategic policy, combine hyperbole with requirements for change. In this case Government – in extolling the self-evident nature of industry as a ‘fundamental input to capability’ – sought closer collaboration between Defence and industry through the development of a native shipbuilding program, to support capability acquisition and sustainment for other major programs, as well as the enhancement of the commercial support on offer to Defence. The Statement also introduced the notion of a ‘Sovereign Defence Industry Capability’, an industrial resource of such vital concern to the Australian Defence Force (ADF) that it must be maintained if not controlled for the purposes of national defence. What the Statement didn’t do, however, was to detail a new path for industry in the context of supporting actual ADF operations.

This issue is one among many examined by Dr Stephan Fruhling, Australian National University, in a recent paper ‘Sovereign Defence Industry Capabilities, Independent Operations and the Future of Australian Defence Strategy.’ As part of the ‘Centre of Gravity’ series of papers, the purpose of its analysis of the idea of ‘sovereign defence industry capabilities’ is to provide strategic policy recommendations, of which there are three.[1] All three are aligned to addressing aspects of the issue of industry support to ADF force structure, and most importantly, operations:

  1. Industry capabilities must relate to scenarios which apply to the force structure of the ADF, ‘not just consider industry as a collection of industry fundamental inputs into capability’.
  2. Australia needs to look beyond a peacetime industry dependence on the US. While reliance was avoided because of the strategic policy orientation of ‘self-reliance’, ‘we must now also move to confront our dependence on US resupply in high-intensity operations’.
  3. Industry will be crucial to enable ADF operations in defence of Australia in the ‘era of long-range precision strike’. This includes the establishment of battle-damage repair capabilities in industry, as well as arrangements for ‘domestic base support’.

Fruhling notes that these ideas are ‘not what the Government had in mind’ with its industry statement. However, they are legitimate concerns that should be echoed in strategic and industry policy calculus. If the Government requires the ADF to be able to operate with any independence from coalition sources of tactical logistics support, the idea of independence should also apply at the strategic level, and with industry in mind.

It is also tremendously worthwhile to consider this issue from the perspective of Defence in its engagement with industry. The role of Defence, and the ADF in particular, in industry policy largely boils down to the articulation of the strategic or operational requirements, and the effective integration of national industrial infrastructure into ADF operations and daily business. This integration is enabled by policy and governance, and through consistent organisational behaviour. Defence presently engages with industry through a multiple of channels, with key agents being the Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group (CASG), Joint Logistics Command (JLC) and a variety of other groups, units, functions, including the Services, responsible for their own component of the logistics process. Each agency or group has its own objectives and requirements, and the approach is demonstrably fragmented. In the past, however, the ADF has concertedly sought a corporate solution to the problem.

In the late 1990’s the ADF pursued a ‘national support agenda’, a strategic approach to its engagement with industry for ‘ the application of all the resources of the Nation to maximise the defence capability of Australia’.[2] The need for a national support strategy had been born out of reforms as early as the 1980’s, and given greater emphasis as a consequence of the downsizing of the ADF’s organic logistics support capabilities which followed. Industry’s ability to support ADF operations was conceptualised, and tested – albeit in a haphazard and ultimately inadequate way – during the major exercises of the time. The idea of national support culminated with the raising of the National Support Division (NSD) in 1997 during the Defence Reform Program. This Division was a fundamental refocussing of a downsizing Strategic Logistics Division of Headquarters ADF, and was to ‘broaden, shape and improve national and international capabilities to better enable the force generation, mobilisation and sustainment for the ADF.’[3] For just over two years NSD developed concepts and policy which reflected strategic-level logistics at its most essential; extracting support from the national economy for the benefit of military outcomes.

With the creation of the Defence Materiel Organisation in 2000, NSD was disestablished with its functions split between the ADF’s capability staff, Strategic Policy Division and the newly raised Joint Logistics Command. This decision came with questionable timing given it was soon after the ADF’s deployment to East Timor in 1999, an operation during which numerous issues with the quality and capacity of national support available could be seen. Only a year later the Departmental-level Defence Committee agreed to the raising of Strategic Logistics Branch in JLC to better progress national support issues, though some of Defence’s senior leaders considered this was merely a temporary solution to the problem. JLC continues to lead in this area, but across the wider Defence organisation the strategic concept of national support has greatly diminished in its potency. The focus now sits on supporting the ADF’s operations at hand, acquisition and sustainment rather than the how and why of mobilising industrial capacity to suit operational sustainability as a strategic concept. By 2003 and the deployment of ADF forces to support coalition operations in Iraq, where much commercial support was obtained through coalition partners and industry engagement was predominantly focussed upon the rapid acquisition of supplies and equipment, strategic engagement for long-term policy objectives was becoming a strategic side-show.

With industry being declared a ‘fundamental input into capability’, perhaps it is time for a new national support agenda. Such an approach will complement evolving strategic and industry policy as depicted in Fruhling’s paper. This does not necessarily mean further wholesale organisational change is required; a succession of changes in the organisation of Defence has already contributed to the degradation of a strategic approach to industry over the last decade. Concepts have been forgotten and policy compromised with entities like the NSD having little time to prove their worth to the ADF. However, it is logical to review authorities and accountabilities, and to reinforce areas responsible for considering industrial capacity and mobilisation on the basis of a purportedly new paradigm in defence-industry relations. It is especially necessary given the increasing engagement of industry as a supplement or complement to military capability, as is being currently postulated through several initiatives being progressed by the ADF’s Services. Finally, it is necessary simply because of its immense importance to any future considerations of how the nation might mobilise in a future war. The ADF may be prepared to launch an operation, but without industry similarly responsive the weight of national power cannot easily be brought to bear.

Just as Fruhling points out that there is much more to ‘sovereign defence industry capability’ to be explained if Government requires the ADF to conduct independent operations, there is also a need for Defence to reinvigorate its approach to engagement with industry to enable effective outcomes in these future missions. The development of proficiencies for military and civilian logisticians and others to engage with industry, or reconsidering the manner and means by which industry is approached, remain important to this end. However, it is also important for logisticians and leaders to approach the matter comprehensively, cognisant that national support to operations is one of considerable professional relevance. As the ADF’s strategic and operational logistics ‘tail’ comprises a greater commercial component, the effective engagement of the ‘sovereign defence industry capability’ must be second nature to logisticians and others in Defence. A strong institutional narrative regarding the integration of industry with all Defence activities, and in particular military operations, must become a priority. In the context of Stephan Fruhling’s view on the future of Australian defence strategy, the ADF’s success in strategically independent operations will be a clear reflection of the quality of this vitally important relationship.

[1] These paraphrased points are summarised at Fruhling, S., Sovereign Defence Industry Capabilities, Independent Operations and the Future of Australian Defence Strategy, ANU College of Asia & the Pacific, 2017, p 2

[2] As approved by Steering Committee, July 2001, from the Inspector General Division, Progress in pursuing the national support approach, Portfolio Evaluation Report, Department of Defence, 2001, p2-1.

[3] Ibid., p 2-7

David Beaumont is a serving military officer, and the thoughts here are his own. This article was originally posted in 2017.

Six strategic challenges for Defence logistics

By Hayden Marshall.

In 2017, Logistics In War was privileged to have been given permission by the author to publish this essay. It is especially relevant to participants of the Australian and New Zealand Defence Logistics Conference and others elsewhere. Air Commodore Hayden Marshall was, at the time of writing this article, the Australian Defence Force’s (ADF) Director-General Strategic Logistics at Joint Logistics Command . You may remember his leadership insights from the post ‘Surviving your time as a military logistician’. The paper was originally prepared to support the professional development of ADF logisticians at the rank of Wing Commander, Commander and Lieutenant Colonel and beyond, and was produced in the interests of stimulating discussion and thought on a number of questions. It therefore does not reflect any official position.

 

As senior logistics officers in the ADF, you will soon (if not already) be placed into key positions that will require you to make important contributions to shape and influence Defence’s logistics capability to be ready to support our current and future military objectives. This will require you to develop new skills, improve your understanding of Defence priorities and gain a broader appreciation of the bigger picture.

The purpose of this discussion paper is to provide you with a collection of potentially unrelated, but relevant, future issues that you may encounter in your future roles. The paper should also generate a sense of urgency to encourage you to better prepare (or improve) your networks and connections to give you the opportunity to review and assess industry (or international) trends as potential opportunities for Defence. This will not be a simple task, but will be made easier with ongoing discussion and active debate amongst the Defence logistics community. Current indicators suggest that the Defence logistics system will need to be more flexible, more adaptable and more resilient than ever due largely to anticipated technological influences, which are already beginning to have an effect.

At the same time, many of the basic tenants of our logistics system will endure, as we will still need to purchase, transport, maintain, store and dispose of stuff – how we do it and how we make use of the best available tools will be the challenge. Through an assessment of the issues considered in this paper (and any others), against a clear understanding of performance requirements and operating constraints, you will need to determine if Defence should be a leader or a follower.

Digital Disruption 

Much is made of the trends in e-commerce and the influence on the supply chain. Many commercial customers are expecting same day delivery for consumables as part of a drive to reduce overhead costs; therefore delivery options need to be effective as stock holdings by users are often limited or non-existent. Amazon continues to explore the use of Drone delivery for small payloads within a limited range, with the realisation that it will be the price and timeliness that will capture the attention of customers. The use of ‘big data’ and ‘cloud’-based applications is becoming increasing prevalent as customers and suppliers understand the possibilities. An interesting quote from an industry observer:

‘It will be especially important for logistics managers to truly weigh up the benefits of leveraging supply chain information against the ability to implement improvements to their logistics strategy.’

Technology improvements will also see a focus on supply chain tools such as beacons and scanners to streamline retail purchasing transactions and monitor stock movements back to the warehouse. Real-time updates to inventories will offer improved situational awareness and the ability for timely intervention where required

The growing use of 3-D printers in commercial applications will have an impact for Defence logistics. The previous challenge of resupplying repair parts to forward deployed units will be replaced with the challenge of resupplying printing media (plastic and metal), along with the computer hardware and power systems necessary to operate industrial 3-D printers. Also 3-D printers require highly stable platforms to allow production of complex items to high tolerance levels, which may not be feasible for deployed units that are operating in austere conditions. The US Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) is working on a program to ensure effective controls are in place for data packages that are only available to an endorsed network of commercial 3-D printers when they receive orders from US military units.

Access to reliable energy sources is necessary to operate current inventory management systems and supply chain hardware. Power outages in garrison or deployed locations already create problems and contribute to lost productivity. The criticality of logistics support to mission success will increase the need to ensure that appropriate back-up systems are in place to protect against accidental or enemy imposed disruptions to power supplies. Expanded use of power systems using alternative generating techniques (wind, solar, etc) may offer opportunities of “off-grid” solutions for both garrison and deployed situations.

Questions to consider: 

  • What are the trends from the retail/private sector that will have applicability in the military sector?
  • Is Defence well placed to monitor and understand future changes to supply chain management?
  • Who should be taking the lead to champion supply chain innovation in Defence?
  • Should Defence make more use of cloud-based opportunities for inventory management, as well as engagement with suppliers and coalition partners?

Cyber Security 

The “good news” stories associated with innovations in the supply chain generally have links to improved information management, computer software enhancements and more capable smart tools to deliver efficiency and effectiveness gains. The vulnerability of computer networks and smart devices to cyber attacks has received increased prominence, with several high-profile organisations subject to hacking and denial of service attacks. Many of our new Defence capability programs rely on participation in global logistics support programs which require an increased level of systems connectivity with external sources to process resupply requirements and provide critical performance data. The dynamic tension between open information systems to support timely data exchanges and the need for information security to protect national interests will be difficult to balance and will require significant work to understand relevant risks and mitigation measures.

We also need to be aware that potential adversaries are likely to have more than a passing interest in our logistics data. The successful aggregation of information from unclassified sources could provide insights into stockholdings and maintenance availability that could be areas of potential vulnerability or exploitation.

Questions to consider:

  • How does Defence ensure that commercial suppliers are adequately protecting their information networks?
  • What logistics information does Defence need to protect?
  • What are the implications for supply chain security resulting from potential cyber attack?

Globally integrated logistics

Our key alliance partner (USA) published a Joint Concept for Logistics (JCL) in Sep 15. The JCL “considers how an evolving Joint Logistics Enterprise could better support operations in a future characterised by the challenge of meeting unremitting strategic requirements with constrained military resources”. The concept proposes the use of globally integrated logistics to support future joint operations which will be characterised by the need to rapidly aggregate globally distributed forces to generate the required military effect. Globally integrated logistics is seen as the “capability to allocate and adjudicate logistics support on a global scale to maximize effectiveness and responsiveness, and to reconcile competing demands for limited logistics resources based on strategic priorities”. The logistics imperatives nominated by the US for the JCL are:

  • Global distribution network
  • Global readiness awareness
  • Responsive logistics planning capabilities

The realisation of this approach will likely require close engagement with coalition partners to identify opportunities to leverage logistics support from non-traditional sources. The recent increases in sealift and airlift capabilities in the ADF will not have gone unnoticed by the US, and whilst US military logistics capabilities are considerable, they may not always be positioned or available to meet responsiveness requirements.

Questions to consider:

  • What opportunities are potentially available for the ADF from the US JCL?
  • Does the ADF Joint Logistics Enterprise Strategy (2016-2021) – (ed. available to ADF members only – many apologies!) – offer sufficient direction to recognise US developments and develop complementary capabilities?

Valuing professional discourse

The pace and scope of technology-based changes that will impact supply chain operations in coming years will be significant. Maintaining overwatch will be important to ensure that the ADF continues to challenge itself and industry partners to pursue opportunities for strategic planning, innovation and continuous improvement. Commentary on Australian Defence logistics, internal and external, is very limited, so it is always intriguing to see a new title appear on news feeds. The recent Kokoda paper written by Gary Waters and AVM (Retd) John Blackburn, provided some interesting observations regarding the current state of Defence logistics and made recommendations regarding a lack of logistics strategy which in turn, inhibits efforts to emphasise the importance of Defence logistics to achieve Defence outcomes. The report starts with some very fundamental questions – what is Defence logistics and what does Defence logistics do? – which most Defence logisticians would expect are universally understood however, this would not appear to be case.

Waters and Blackburn also make a number of informed suggestions regarding future trends and drivers, as well as improvement opportunities. Interestingly, I have found no reference to follow-on discussions or debates in the Defence logistics community (or associated partners) that either support or challenge these ideas. Therefore, how do we value the contribution of these thoughts and ideas as they apply to the development of Defence’s logistics capability?

The value of public debate cannot be overestimated, provided that it is conducted in a professional manner. Effective debate provides the opportunity to consider credible options that may not be readily apparent and highlights areas that would benefit from informed research. Consequently, the field of operational research becomes increasingly important to be able to understand historical, political, economic and environmental factors as they apply to contemporary circumstances.

As another reinforcement of the struggle to gain main stream attention for defence logistics matters, a simple study was highlighted in a recent research paper.[1] The paper presented names of journals (US based) that had four or more articles indexed in ABI/Inform Global and Proquest Research Library-Business mentioning ‘military logistics’ or ‘defence logistics’ or defense logistics’ in the title, abstract, key words or text from 1952 to 2010. Details are shown below:

  • Air Force Journal of Logistics – 65 articles
  • Management Science – 15 articles
  • Military Medicine – 14 articles
  • Parameters – 11 articles
  • International Journal of Physical Distribution and Logistics Management – 10 articles
  • Journal of Business Logistics – 10 articles
  • Journal of the Operational Research Society – 9 articles
  • Public Administration Review – 8 articles
  • Journal of Public Procurement- 7 articles
  • Journal of Government Financial Management – 7 articles
  • National Contract Management Journal – 5 articles
  • IIE Transactions- 4 articles
  • Interface – 4 articles
  • Operations Research – 4 articles
  • The Journal of Military History – 4 articles

Of concern is the most prominent of the publications in terms of volume, Air Force Journal of Logistics, ceased publication in late 2012 with the disbandment of the Air Force Logistics Management Agency. Perhaps the “blogosphere” will replace traditional journals in the future and there appears to be plenty of room for new forums regarding defence logistics.

Questions to consider:

  • Should the ADF invest in targeted industry placements to gain an improved understanding of supply chain management from a commercial perspective?
  • Do ADF members understand the value of professional associations to enhance engagement with industry?
  • Where do you get your information to make sure that you are aware of contemporary logistics matters relevant to commercial and defence interests?

Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) 

Modern military theorists, encouraged by the ideas of William Lind, are citing the emergence of a new generation of warfare whereby sovereign states are losing their monopoly on war and future conflict will be linked to cultural, not sovereignty issues. The legitimacy of states will be challenged, wars will be undeclared and the contest will be more about the supremacy of ideas as opposed to traditional territory battles.

Third generation warfare is based on “blitzkrieg” or manoeuvre warfare following World War I. The tactics of speed and surprise to “bypass and collapse” enemy forces represent a significant challenge for military logisticians with high reliance on decentralised logistics to support dispersed forces. Therefore, what are the challenges of 4GW that need to be addressed by today’s (and tomorrow’s) logisticians?

An interesting observation by Parag Khanna, an international relations commentator, in his recent book where he suggests that supply chains and connectivity, not sovereignty and borders, will be the organising principles of humanity in the 21st century.[1] For both military strategists and logisticians, the challenge to understand supply chains and their dependencies will be important however, further consideration will need to be given to understand interests of other parties in the same supply chains.

With this in mind, how well do we understand our own supply chains? Through the work of Parag Khanna, I was introduced to some very interesting research by DHL through their Global Connectedness Index. The annual report provides a series of graphical representations of global trade volumes, information exchanges and financial transactions. These views confirm Australia’s vulnerability due to distance and stark economic realities as to where priorities lie. For a fee, there are some software products (e.g. Sourcemap) that provide end-to-end mapping of your supply chain that could provide a new perspective to identify risks and opportunities.

Questions to consider:

  • What measures need to be considered to ensure that supply chains are appropriately protected, as distinct to traditional military approaches of considering SLOCs, GLOCs and ALOCs?
  • Do our preparedness assessments appropriately consider supply chain variables?
  • Should the ADF be investigating the applicability of supply chain mapping tools?

Fifth Generation Hardware 

The ADF is presently undergoing the most significant recapitalisation of defence capabilities since WWII, across all three Services. Legacy fleets of hardware are being replaced by newer and far more capable equipment that will be managed under very different maintenance/support regimes. The recent announcement of the Naval Shipbuilding Plan provides a very clear indication of the proposed scale of industrial development activity that will significantly reshape capabilities in the two key shipbuilding locations of Henderson (WA) and Osborne (SA). The “industrial ecosystems” that will emerge in these locations are likely to present new opportunities for logistics support options.

The new defence equipment has less failures (comparatively) and periodic maintenance (preventative) does not need to be undertaken with the same level of frequency. The logistics support requirements for the future force will be fundamentally different to the logistics support requirements of the current force. Increased use of technology for systems diagnostics will ensure that maintenance activities are given clear direction and priority. In turn, supply support will be better informed of required stockholding levels. New materials offer improved protection and resilience for defence equipment. For many components, there is no intent to repair any damages, as it is cheaper and quicker to replace with new items. Nanotechnology is offering further opportunities for improvements in electronics, medical therapies, energy utilisation and environmental remediation that will also reshape logistics support requirements. Increased use of artificial intelligence will progressively replace many areas currently prone to error and bias that currently lead to sub-optimal results. In short, the future looks to be very bright.

Questions to consider:

  • What does this mean for the disposition of logistics support activities in the National Support Base?
  • What logistics support activities will continue to be performed by military personnel?
  • How do we make the transition to 5th generation logistics support?
  • Do we really understand the extent of change on the horizon for logistics support that is associated with new technologies that are no longer in the world of science fiction, but are today’s reality?

The six strategic challenges for Defence logistics

The list of challenges/issues/opportunities is not exhaustive – the intent of this and preceding posts is to stimulate thought and discussion – with a view to identifying other internal or external influences. Many of these issues are bigger than Defence, but we will need to develop plans that clearly identify how we intend to respond, along with an assessment of resources required to respond to the challenge. As a community, we need to develop the necessary policies, processes and tools that will provide operational commanders with the confidence that the Defence logistics system will be sufficiently resilient and responsive to support mission requirements. Increased levels of confidence provide the ability to more fully explore new and emerging opportunities to optimise the supply chain in all circumstances, while clearly understanding risks and vulnerabilities.

Hayden Marshall is a Logistics Officer in the Royal Australian Air Force Reserve, with considerable experience as a tactical, operational and strategic logistics commander and planner. At the time of writing this article he was Deputy Commander of the ADF’s Joint Logistics Command.

[1] Khanna, P., Connectography: Mapping the Global Network Revolution. 2016

The Australian Defence Force and industry support to operations – is it time for a new ‘national support agenda’?

By David Beaumont.

In 2016, the Australian Government released its 2016 Defence White Paper and the supplemental Defence Industry Policy Statement. Industry Statements signify Government intent to Australian Defence industry, and like strategic policy, combine hyperbole with requirements for change. In this case Government – in extolling the self-evident nature of industry as a ‘fundamental input to capability’ – sought closer collaboration between Defence and industry through the development of a native shipbuilding program, to support capability acquisition and sustainment for other major programs, as well as the enhancement of the commercial support on offer to Defence. The Statement also introduced the notion of a ‘Sovereign Defence Industry Capability’, an industrial resource of such vital concern to the Australian Defence Force (ADF) that it must be maintained if not controlled for the purposes of national defence. What the Statement didn’t do, however, was to detail a new path for industry in the context of supporting actual ADF operations.

This issue is one among many examined by Dr Stephan Fruhling, Australian National University, in a recent paper ‘Sovereign Defence Industry Capabilities, Independent Operations and the Future of Australian Defence Strategy.’ As part of the ‘Centre of Gravity’ series of papers, the purpose of its analysis of the idea of ‘sovereign defence industry capabilities’ is to provide strategic policy recommendations, of which there are three.[1] All three are aligned to addressing aspects of the issue of industry support to ADF force structure, and most importantly, operations:

  1. Industry capabilities must relate to scenarios which apply to the force structure of the ADF, ‘not just consider industry as a collection of industry fundamental inputs into capability’.
  2. Australia needs to look beyond a peacetime industry dependence on the US. While reliance was avoided because of the strategic policy orientation of ‘self-reliance’, ‘we must now also move to confront our dependence on US resupply in high-intensity operations’.
  3. Industry will be crucial to enable ADF operations in defence of Australia in the ‘era of long-range precision strike’. This includes the establishment of battle-damage repair capabilities in industry, as well as arrangements for ‘domestic base support’.

Fruhling notes that these ideas are ‘not what the Government had in mind’ with its industry statement. However, they are legitimate concerns that should be echoed in strategic and industry policy calculus. If the Government requires the ADF to be able to operate with any independence from coalition sources of tactical logistics support, the idea of independence should also apply at the strategic level, and with industry in mind.

It is also tremendously worthwhile to consider this issue from the perspective of Defence in its engagement with industry. The role of Defence, and the ADF in particular, in industry policy largely boils down to the articulation of the strategic or operational requirements, and the effective integration of national industrial infrastructure into ADF operations and daily business. This integration is enabled by policy and governance, and through consistent organisational behaviour. Defence presently engages with industry through a multiple of channels, with key agents being the Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group (CASG), Joint Logistics Command (JLC) and a variety of other groups, units, functions, including the Services, responsible for their own component of the logistics process. Each agency or group has its own objectives and requirements, and the approach is demonstrably fragmented. In the past, however, the ADF has concertedly sought a corporate solution to the problem.

 

Land 400 Phase 2

Contenders for Army’s future combat reconnaissance vehicles undergoing air portability trials. Photo by Department of Defence.

 

In the late 1990’s the ADF pursued a ‘national support agenda’, a strategic approach to its engagement with industry for ‘ the application of all the resources of the Nation to maximise the defence capability of Australia’.[2] The need for a national support strategy had been born out of reforms as early as the 1980’s, and given greater emphasis as a consequence of the downsizing of the ADF’s organic logistics support capabilities which followed. Industry’s ability to support ADF operations was conceptualised, and tested – albeit in a haphazard and ultimately inadequate way – during the major exercises of the time. The idea of national support culminated with the raising of the National Support Division (NSD) in 1997 during the Defence Reform Program. This Division was a fundamental refocussing of a downsizing Strategic Logistics Division of Headquarters ADF, and was to ‘broaden, shape and improve national and international capabilities to better enable the force generation, mobilisation and sustainment for the ADF.’[3] For just over two years NSD developed concepts and policy which reflected strategic-level logistics at its most essential; extracting support from the national economy for the benefit of military outcomes.

With the creation of the Defence Materiel Organisation in 2000, NSD was disestablished with its functions split between the ADF’s capability staff, Strategic Policy Division and the newly raised Joint Logistics Command. This decision came with questionable timing given it was soon after the ADF’s deployment to East Timor in 1999, an operation during which numerous issues with the quality and capacity of national support available could be seen. Only a year later the Departmental-level Defence Committee agreed to the raising of Strategic Logistics Branch in JLC to better progress national support issues, though some of Defence’s senior leaders considered this was merely a temporary solution to the problem. JLC continues to lead in this area, but across the wider Defence organisation the strategic concept of national support has greatly diminished in its potency. The focus now sits on supporting the ADF’s operations at hand, acquisition and sustainment rather than the how and why of mobilising industrial capacity to suit operational sustainability as a strategic concept. By 2003 and the deployment of ADF forces to support coalition operations in Iraq, where much commercial support was obtained through coalition partners and industry engagement was predominantly focussed upon the rapid acquisition of supplies and equipment, strategic engagement for long-term policy objectives was becoming a strategic side-show.

With industry being declared a ‘fundamental input into capability’, perhaps it is time for a new national support agenda. Such an approach will complement evolving strategic and industry policy as depicted in Fruhling’s paper. This does not necessarily mean further wholesale organisational change is required; a succession of changes in the organisation of Defence has already contributed to the degradation of a strategic approach to industry over the last decade. Concepts have been forgotten and policy compromised with entities like the NSD having little time to prove their worth to the ADF. However, it is logical to review authorities and accountabilities, and to reinforce areas responsible for considering industrial capacity and mobilisation on the basis of a purportedly new paradigm in defence-industry relations. It is especially necessary given the increasing engagement of industry as a supplement or complement to military capability, as is being currently postulated through several initiatives being progressed by the ADF’s Services. Finally, it is necessary simply because of its immense importance to any future considerations of how the nation might mobilise in a future war. The ADF may be prepared to launch an operation, but without industry similarly responsive the weight of national power cannot easily be brought to bear.

Just as Fruhling points out that there is much more to ‘sovereign defence industry capability’ to be explained if Government requires the ADF to conduct independent operations, there is also a need for Defence to reinvigorate its approach to engagement with industry to enable effective outcomes in these future missions. The development of proficiencies for military and civilian logisticians and others to engage with industry, or reconsidering the manner and means by which industry is approached, remain important to this end. However, it is also important for logisticians and leaders to approach the matter comprehensively, fully cognisant that national support to operations is one of considerable professional relevance. As the ADF’s strategic and operational logistics ‘tail’ comprises a greater commercial component, the effective engagement of the ‘sovereign defence industry capability’ must be second nature to logisticians and others in Defence. A strong institutional narrative regarding the integration of industry with all Defence activities, and in particular military operations, must become a priority. In the context of Stephan Fruhling’s view on the future of Australian defence strategy, the ADF’s success in strategically independent operations will be a clear reflection of the quality of this vitally important relationship.

[1] These paraphrased points are summarised at Fruhling, S., Sovereign Defence Industry Capabilities, Independent Operations and the Future of Australian Defence Strategy, ANU College of Asia & the Pacific, 2017, p 2

[2] As approved by Steering Committee, July 2001, from the Inspector General Division, Progress in pursuing the national support approach, Portfolio Evaluation Report, Department of Defence, 2001, p2-1.

[3] Ibid., p 2-7

Six strategic challenges – fourth generation warfare and fifth generation equipment

By Hayden Marshall.

In part one and two of ‘Six strategic challenges for Defence logistics’ Air Commodore Hayden Marshall describes how digital disruption and cyber threats are likely to change Defence logistics in the future. In part three, the challenges posed by ‘fourth generation warfare’ and the use of ‘fifth generation equipment’ are discussed.

As described in part one, this article is an edited component of a larger paper has been divided into three parts, each of which contains two key issues relevant to Defence (strategic) logistics. Each is followed by questions as prompts for future consideration. The topics have been written with Australian Defence (ADF and Department) in mind, but you will find the themes equally applicable to other militaries and Defence departments

Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) 

Modern military theorists, encouraged by the ideas of William Lind, are citing the emergence of a new generation of warfare whereby sovereign states are losing their monopoly on war and future conflict will be linked to cultural, not sovereignty issues. The legitimacy of states will be challenged, wars will be undeclared and the contest will be more about the supremacy of ideas as opposed to traditional territory battles.

Third generation warfare is based on “blitzkrieg” or manoeuvre warfare following World War I. The tactics of speed and surprise to “bypass and collapse” enemy forces represent a significant challenge for military logisticians with high reliance on decentralised logistics to support dispersed forces. Therefore, what are the challenges of 4GW that need to be addressed by today’s (and tomorrow’s) logisticians?

An interesting observation by Parag Khanna, an international relations commentator, in his recent book where he suggests that supply chains and connectivity, not sovereignty and borders, will be the organising principles of humanity in the 21st century.[1] For both military strategists and logisticians, the challenge to understand supply chains and their dependencies will be important however, further consideration will need to be given to understand interests of other parties in the same supply chains.

With this in mind, how well do we understand our own supply chains? Through the work of Parag Khanna, I was introduced to some very interesting research by DHL through their Global Connectedness Index. The annual report provides a series of graphical representations of global trade volumes, information exchanges and financial transactions. These views confirm Australia’s vulnerability due to distance and stark economic realities as to where priorities lie. For a fee, there are some software products (e.g. Sourcemap) that provide end-to-end mapping of your supply chain that could provide a new perspective to identify risks and opportunities.

Questions to consider:

  • What measures need to be considered to ensure that supply chains are appropriately protected, as distinct to traditional military approaches of considering SLOCs, GLOCs and ALOCs?
  • Do our preparedness assessments appropriately consider supply chain variables?
  • Should the ADF be investigating the applicability of supply chain mapping tools?

Fifth Generation Hardware 

The ADF is presently undergoing the most significant recapitalisation of defence capabilities since WWII, across all three Services. Legacy fleets of hardware are being replaced by newer and far more capable equipment that will be managed under very different maintenance/support regimes. The recent announcement of the Naval Shipbuilding Plan provides a very clear indication of the proposed scale of industrial development activity that will significantly reshape capabilities in the two key shipbuilding locations of Henderson (WA) and Osborne (SA). The “industrial ecosystems” that will emerge in these locations are likely to present new opportunities for logistics support options.

The new defence equipment has less failures (comparatively) and periodic maintenance (preventative) does not need to be undertaken with the same level of frequency. The logistics support requirements for the future force will be fundamentally different to the logistics support requirements of the current force. Increased use of technology for systems diagnostics will ensure that maintenance activities are given clear direction and priority. In turn, supply support will be better informed of required stockholding levels. New materials offer improved protection and resilience for defence equipment. For many components, there is no intent to repair any damages, as it is cheaper and quicker to replace with new items. Nanotechnology is offering further opportunities for improvements in electronics, medical therapies, energy utilisation and environmental remediation that will also reshape logistics support requirements. Increased use of artificial intelligence will progressively replace many areas currently prone to error and bias that currently lead to sub-optimal results. In short, the future looks to be very bright.

Questions to consider:

  • What does this mean for the disposition of logistics support activities in the National Support Base?
  • What logistics support activities will continue to be performed by military personnel?
  • How do we make the transition to 5th generation logistics support?
  • Do we really understand the extent of change on the horizon for logistics support that is associated with new technologies that are no longer in the world of science fiction, but are today’s reality?

The six strategic challenges for Defence logistics

The list of challenges/issues/opportunities is not exhaustive – the intent of this and preceding posts is to stimulate thought and discussion – with a view to identifying other internal or external influences. Many of these issues are bigger than Defence, but we will need to develop plans that clearly identify how we intend to respond, along with an assessment of resources required to respond to the challenge. As a community, we need to develop the necessary policies, processes and tools that will provide operational commanders with the confidence that the Defence logistics system will be sufficiently resilient and responsive to support mission requirements. Increased levels of confidence provide the ability to more fully explore new and emerging opportunities to optimise the supply chain in all circumstances, while clearly understanding risks and vulnerabilities.

Hayden Marshall is a Logistics Officer in the Royal Australian Air Force, with considerable experience as a tactical, operational and strategic logistics commander and planner. He is currently posted to Joint Logistics Command.

[1] Khanna, P., Connectography: Mapping the Global Network Revolution. 2016

In the interests of full disclosure, the paper was prepared to support the professional development of ADF logisticians at the rank of Wing Commander, Commander and Lieutenant Colonel and beyond, and was produced in the interests of stimulating discussion. It therefore does not reflect any official position.

Six strategic challenges for Defence logistics – Part One

By Hayden Marshall.

Logistics In War is privileged to have been given permission by the author to publish a series of posts based upon a Discussion Paper written by the Australian Defence Force’s (ADF) Director-General Strategic Logistics, Air Commodore Hayden Marshall. You may remember his leadership insights from the post ‘Surviving your time as a military logistician’. In the interests of full disclosure, the paper was prepared to support the professional development of ADF logisticians at the rank of Wing Commander, Commander and Lieutenant Colonel and beyond, and was produced in the interests of stimulating discussion. It therefore does not reflect any official position.

For the purposes of this series of posts, the original paper has been divided into three parts, each of which contains two key issues relevant to Defence (strategic) logistics. Each is followed by questions as prompts for future consideration. The topics have been written with Australian Defence (ADF and Department) in mind, but you will find the themes equally applicable to other militaries and Defence departments.

Enjoy the articles, and we would like to hear your thoughts on the topics presented by Air Commodore Marshall.

 

As senior logistics officers in the ADF, you will soon (if not already) be placed into key positions that will require you to make important contributions to shape and influence Defence’s logistics capability to be ready to support our current and future military objectives. This will require you to develop new skills, improve your understanding of Defence priorities and gain a broader appreciation of the bigger picture.

The purpose of this discussion paper is to provide you with a collection of potentially unrelated, but relevant, future issues that you may encounter in your future roles. The paper should also generate a sense of urgency to encourage you to better prepare (or improve) your networks and connections to give you the opportunity to review and assess industry (or international) trends as potential opportunities for Defence. This will not be a simple task, but will be made easier with ongoing discussion and active debate amongst the Defence logistics community. Current indicators suggest that the Defence logistics system will need to be more flexible, more adaptable and more resilient than ever due largely to anticipated technological influences, which are already beginning to have an effect.

At the same time, many of the basic tenants of our logistics system will endure, as we will still need to purchase, transport, maintain, store and dispose of stuff – how we do it and how we make use of the best available tools will be the challenge. Through an assessment of the issues considered in this paper (and any others), against a clear understanding of performance requirements and operating constraints, you will need to determine if Defence should be a leader or a follower.

Digital Disruption 

Much is made of the trends in e-commerce and the influence on the supply chain. Many commercial customers are expecting same day delivery for consumables as part of a drive to reduce overhead costs; therefore delivery options need to be effective as stock holdings by users are often limited or non-existent. Amazon continues to explore the use of Drone delivery for small payloads within a limited range, with the realisation that it will be the price and timeliness that will capture the attention of customers. The use of ‘big data’ and ‘cloud’-based applications is becoming increasing prevalent as customers and suppliers understand the possibilities. An interesting quote from an industry observer:

‘It will be especially important for logistics managers to truly weigh up the benefits of leveraging supply chain information against the ability to implement improvements to their logistics strategy.’

Technology improvements will also see a focus on supply chain tools such as beacons and scanners to streamline retail purchasing transactions and monitor stock movements back to the warehouse. Real-time updates to inventories will offer improved situational awareness and the ability for timely intervention where required

The growing use of 3-D printers in commercial applications will have an impact for Defence logistics. The previous challenge of resupplying repair parts to forward deployed units will be replaced with the challenge of resupplying printing media (plastic and metal), along with the computer hardware and power systems necessary to operate industrial 3-D printers. Also 3-D printers require highly stable platforms to allow production of complex items to high tolerance levels, which may not be feasible for deployed units that are operating in austere conditions. The US Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) is working on a program to ensure effective controls are in place for data packages that are only available to an endorsed network of commercial 3-D printers when they receive orders from US military units.

Access to reliable energy sources is necessary to operate current inventory management systems and supply chain hardware. Power outages in garrison or deployed locations already create problems and contribute to lost productivity. The criticality of logistics support to mission success will increase the need to ensure that appropriate back-up systems are in place to protect against accidental or enemy imposed disruptions to power supplies. Expanded use of power systems using alternative generating techniques (wind, solar, etc) may offer opportunities of “off-grid” solutions for both garrison and deployed situations.

Questions to consider: 

  • What are the trends from the retail/private sector that will have applicability in the military sector?
  • Is Defence well placed to monitor and understand future changes to supply chain management?
  • Who should be taking the lead to champion supply chain innovation in Defence?
  • Should Defence make more use of cloud-based opportunities for inventory management, as well as engagement with suppliers and coalition partners?

Cyber Security 

The “good news” stories associated with innovations in the supply chain generally have links to improved information management, computer software enhancements and more capable smart tools to deliver efficiency and effectiveness gains. The vulnerability of computer networks and smart devices to cyber attacks has received increased prominence, with several high-profile organisations subject to hacking and denial of service attacks. Many of our new Defence capability programs rely on participation in global logistics support programs which require an increased level of systems connectivity with external sources to process resupply requirements and provide critical performance data. The dynamic tension between open information systems to support timely data exchanges and the need for information security to protect national interests will be difficult to balance and will require significant work to understand relevant risks and mitigation measures.

We also need to be aware that potential adversaries are likely to have more than a passing interest in our logistics data. The successful aggregation of information from unclassified sources could provide insights into stockholdings and maintenance availability that could be areas of potential vulnerability or exploitation.

Questions to consider:

  • How does Defence ensure that commercial suppliers are adequately protecting their information networks?
  • What logistics information does Defence need to protect?
  • What are the implications for supply chain security resulting from potential cyber attack?

Part two will follow shortly.

Joint logistics by design – is it time for a permanent joint logistics formation?

By Editor.

Meegan Olding, a serving Australian Army officer writing on the Land Power Forum, contends that emerging requirements are strengthening the case for us to rethink joint logistics and its role in capability development, force generation and its role in the operational area. Contentiously, she also argues that it is time to consider whether logistics formations and functions relevant to theatre entry and tactical force sustainment, currently single-Service responsibilities, should be ‘joint by design’.

This challenging argument posits force efficiency can be improved by reducing duplication and improving coordination. The establishment of joint theatre capabilities would continue the trend by which the joint logistics enterprise is seen to offer considerable command, control and logistics efficiencies currently evident at Defence’s strategic level. Furthermore, with hollowness existing in enabling functions and logistics capabilities in all three Services of the Australian Defence Force (ADF), such a solution sounds promising for force generation reasons, but also with respect to the stewardship  of logistics capability.

The major cost to this approach is recognised as being a loss of control for the Services as ‘domain owners’ and force generators who must accept further risk and trust that the joint logistics system will deliver even more than it does today. Understandably, this makes the option a particularly ‘uncomfortable’ proposition. Perhaps, as suggested, the alternative is to make joint theatre capabilities a responsibility for the Army-led ‘Deployable Joint Force Headquarters’?

The article alludes to one key question worth considering; although logistics interdependence in operations may be best achieved through robust capabilities held by the Services, are such theatre and force sustainment capabilities more effective and easier to generate as part of a joint, tactically-oriented, logistics force?

A strong joint force needs a strong land force, but this should not be at the expense of developing a world class joint logistics system …. The establishment of the ADFHQ provides momentum for the development of a joint enabler capability, however it requires bold decisions, less risk aversion and trust amongst the Services. The time for ‘joint logistics by design’ is now, but is the ADF mature enough to manage the delicate interplay between competition and cooperation?

Enjoy the article – found here.